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ABSTRACT 
 
Fertility in China in 2000: A County Level Analysis.  (May 2005) 
 
Heather Kathleen Mary Terrell, B.S., Texas A&M University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
 
 
In order to maintain itself into the future, the People’s Republic of China 
undertook in the 1970s a legendary demographic endeavor dealing with the artificial 
constraint of population growth.  The “later, longer, fewer” policy and the more rigid 
one-child policy were efforts to expedite the demographic transition in the country.  The 
ultimate goal was the stabilization and eventual decline of the population, via fertility at 
below-replacement levels for an extended period of time.  According to the 2000 census, 
the total fertility rate (TFR) for China was 1.22—well below 2.1, the replacement level 
of fertility.  However, the country’s TFR fluctuated spatially with rates of .86, 1.08, and 
1.43, for cities, towns, and rural areas, respectively.   
Undoubtedly, China’s family planning policy is largely responsible for the 
nation’s current low fertility, as well as the geographical variation in fertility just 
mentioned.  Research has shown, however, that other factors have played a part in this 
fertility transition and the subsequent variation at the regional, provincial, and county 
levels.  In keeping with the expectations of demographic transition theory (DTT), 
quantitative studies conducted over the last twenty years have linked an assortment of 
socioeconomic factors with China’s fertility decline and nationwide inconsistencies 
(Birdsall and Jamison 1983; Tien 1984; Poston and Gu 1987; Freedman et al. 1988; 
Peng 1989; Poston and Jia 1990; Poston 2000).   
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My thesis built on and extended the above work, using the newly available 
demographic data provided by Census 2000.  I tested the efficiency of demographic 
transition variables in explaining the variation in the TFR among the counties of China 
by estimating twelve Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression equations.  Specifically, I 
examined the ways in which variables such as ethnicity, agricultural detachment, 
urbanization, economic conditions, cultural norms and gender differences were related to 
Chinese fertility in a nationwide analysis and in two region-specific analyses.  My 
results showed rather definitively that demographic transition theory is applicable for 
predicting and understanding fertility among the counties of China.  Irrespective of the 
nation’s extensive family planning policy, it is apparent that other factors contribute to 
the varying fertility rates across the country. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
China, containing one-fifth of the world’s population, has long recognized the 
need to slow down its rate of natural increase.  In 1998, its rate of natural increase 
apparently dropped below 1%, the lowest rate in history excluding the 1959-61 period of 
famine (Attane 2001).  Since China’s borders are more or less sealed, its population 
growth is primarily determined by the total number of births and deaths.  Thus, the 
successful deceleration of natural increase depends on the attenuation of the country’s 
fertility rate.  Although the Chinese government has played a large role in depressing the 
national fertility rate, other factors have also contributed to this transition.  
The research to be reported in this thesis will analyze some of the socioeconomic 
and related factors that are associated with fertility among China’s counties in 2000.  
Before discussing these issues, however, a short history of population and family 
planning in China will be presented.  Hopefully these discussions will provide a 
perspective for the later discussion and presentation of this thesis. 
While efforts to curb population growth were made in the 1950s and 1960s, the  
Chinese government took a more serious stance in 1971 with the delivery of the “wan  
 
(later), xi (longer), shao (fewer)” policy (Banister 1987; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh  
 
1985; Cooney and Li 1994; Tien 1980).  This strategy demanded that couples marry late, 
elongate their birth intervals, and have a small number of children.  “Large families are  
 
undesirable” became the slogan of the day, and a family with two children was deemed 
__________ 
This thesis follows the style and format of American Sociological Review. 
 2
 
to be of perfect size (Tien 1980).  Regulations were most restrictive in the cities where 
couples were urged to postpone marriage until age 25 for women and 28 for men and to 
have a maximum of two children (Attane 2002).  Rural residents were given some 
leniency, with marriage age minimums of 23 and 25, and a family size limit of three 
children.  A birth-spacing interval of no less than three or four years was required for 
both urban and rural couples.  In 1977, a maximum of two children was directed at all 
couples, both urban and rural (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985).  “According to Chen 
Muhua, Vice Premier and Head of the Planned Reproduction Group of the State Council 
of the Central Government, China’s overall rate of natural increase had fallen to 12.1 per 
1,000 in 1978 from 23.4 in 1971, and the birthrate had dropped to 18.3 per 1,000 in 1978 
from the previous high of 40.0 per 1,000 in the 1960s (Tien 1980: 65).”  
In addition to the “wan, xi, shao” policy, important institutional changes were 
taking place in China at this time also.  Following the demise of Mao Zedong in 1976, it 
became apparent that his administrative strategy was to blame for the country’s 
deteriorating economy.  As Prybyla (1990: 114) notes, “the signs of morbidity revealed 
by that economy were many, among them: chronic shortages of wanted goods; huge 
resource misallocations—waste; breakdown of the incentive system—low factor 
productivity; and technological backwardness.”  Peasants were disproportionately the 
targets of exploitation, paying high prices for manufactured items and being paid low 
prices for obligatory grain sales (Walder 1989; Lardy 1983; Riskin 1987).  As a result, 
the disparity in income and food consumption among urban and rural areas grew larger 
(Walder 1989).   
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The economic reform effort began in 1979 and was entitled “Four 
Modernizations,” indicating “the four areas—agriculture, industry, science and 
technology, and national defense—to be modernized (Prybyla 1990: 114).”  Leaders 
were unwilling to surrender to the market system, so true economic freedom was never 
granted in this endeavor.  Nevertheless, two decades of collectivized agriculture finally 
came to a halt with the initiation of the “household responsibility system,” which 
converted commune farming into individual family farming (Feder et al. 1992; Prybyla 
1990).  Now commune land is leased to households for periods of up to 15 years, and the 
standard farm is three-quarters of an acre in size.  Families still have to furnish the local 
state authorities with specific yields of certain crops at state-set prices, if they are to 
continue to be allowed to live on the land.  After contractual quotas have been fulfilled 
with the government, peasants may consume any surplus food themselves or even sell it 
on the streets.    
The Deng Xiaoping administration believed that substantial population growth 
would interfere with the goals of the “Four Modernizations,” by “hampering attainment 
of full employment and by cutting into increases in capital accumulation, living 
standards, and education” (Chen 1979; Liu and Song 1981; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 
1985: 586).  Projections regarding economic and sustenance resources suggested that 
China would boast nationwide security if it could shrink its population to 650-700 
million by the middle of the twenty-first century (Liu and Song 1981; Bongaarts and 
Greenhalgh 1985).  Their judgment hinging on these types of forecasts, the post-Mao 
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leadership took extraordinary legal and administrative measures to control population 
growth. 
Although the later-longer-fewer campaign was successful in reducing the fertility 
rate, by the late 1970s the concept of “shao” was modified to “one is enough” (Tien 
1980).  The issues which resulted in the one-child policy are not clear-cut.  One large 
trigger was governmental awareness that the country’s young age composition would 
create growth for years to come if couples were allowed to have two children (Bongaarts 
and Greenhalgh 1985).  By mid-1978 the decision had been made and in January 1979, 
the government instigated the renowned one-child policy—the most stringent national 
policy in the history of the world (Banister 1984; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985).   
Throughout 1979, the Chinese government became more resolute in their family 
planning endeavor, as they hoped to restrict the total population to 1.2 billion by the end 
of the 20th century.  In 1980, Party Chairman Hua Guofeng announced that each couple 
of Han majority nationality would be restricted to one child only.  A minute fraction of 
urban and rural couples (i.e. 5 and 10 percent, respectively) in exceptional situations 
would be permitted to have a second child (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985).  The 
policy focus was the solitary child; however, delayed marriage and delayed childbearing 
were still considered important factors and were to be given “appropriate stress” from 
local officials (Central Committee of the CPC 1983).  In actuality these two issues have 
been accorded little emphasis in comparison with family size restriction (Bongaarts and 
Greenhalgh 1985). 
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The enforcement of this new policy was facilitated by earlier efforts, which made 
services and contraceptives widespread and easily attainable for the population at large.  
To promote acceptance of the one-child policy, the government established the “one 
child” certificate.  This certificate guaranteed an array of benefits to couples with one 
child who pledged to have no more (Cooney and Li 1994).  Three other factors 
strengthened conformity: (1) the 1980 marriage law making birth control mandatory, (2) 
the escalating use of abortion and sterilization as fall back measures to accomplish the 
population planning targets, and (3) fines against families having third and higher parity 
births (Banister 1987; Tien 1991; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985).  The estimated total 
fertility rate (TFR) fell from 2.7 in 1981 to 2.1 in 1984, creating enthusiasm among 
officials (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988). 
 Whereas the one-child policy has been very effective in urban areas, it has faced 
considerable obstacles in the country.  In its initial stages, over 40% of rural births were 
unauthorized and thus in violation of the policy (Attane 2001).  It’s fair to say that a little 
bit of freedom went a long way for the effected peasantry.  Economic reforms during the 
1980s served to weaken the control of state and local powers over individuals, which 
stalled the performance of family-planning policies.  The “household responsibility 
system” not only bestowed more autonomy on rural residents, it also increased 
incentives for large families by moving responsibility from the commune to the 
household.  Additionally, state policies intended to strengthen the family planning 
campaign have often worked against it.  One such case is the Marriage Law of 1980.  
“Although it increased the legal ages of marriage from 18 to 20 for women and from 20 
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to 22 for men, it invalidated the higher de facto age limits that had been in effect during 
the later-longer-fewer campaign of the 1970s, and effectively lowered the age of 
marriage” (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985: 592).  
To ease public criticism and defiance, the Party Central Committee released 
Central Document 7 in 1984, which called for more leniencies in regards to second 
births among rural couples and others with “real difficulties,” provided that the 1.2 
billion population goal for the year 2000 was respected (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 
1985: 588).  They were optimistic that Document 7 would work “by open[ing] a small 
hole to close up a large one” (Greenhalgh 1986: 492; Qian 1997: 221).  As head of the 
State Family Planning Commission, Wang Wei, remarked, cadres (i.e. family planning 
workers) “must not be too rigid in delivering a sermon to the masses” (Beijing Domestic 
Service 1985; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985: 588).  This sent mixed messages to 
cadres, who were expected to satisfy birth planning targets, and at the same time, 
accommodate the people (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988).  Some cadres stood 
firm while others wavered, the result being geographical fertility fluctuations.  
The watery plan proved ineffective as China’s estimated TFR climbed from 2.1 
in 1984 to 2.4 in 1986.  Roughly one fifth of this upsurge was due to a change in age 
composition, while the rest was caused by a rise in fertility (Hardee-Cleaveland and 
Banister 1988).   
Failed attempts at restructuring brought about another change of leadership in the 
State Family Planning Commission in the late 1980s, which then developed regulations 
to invigorate family planning in rural areas (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988; Qian 
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1997).  Li Peng, interim Premier of the State Council, declared that “to keep the 
country’s population at about 1.2 billion by the end of the century, China must ‘strictly 
carry out’ the policies of promoting later marriages and restricting each couple to only 
one child” (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988: 251).  Provinces and localities were 
granted significant liberty in issuing second-child permits, though they were to remain 
stanch in their efforts to control population growth and abide by the central plan. 
 As Scharping (2003) has illustrated, these second-child permits vary extensively 
among the provinces.  For instance, the most recent conditions for second births in urban 
Sichuan are: “(1) the first child is disabled or dead, (2) pregnancy after long years of 
childless marriage and a subsequent adoption, (3) in a remarriage one spouse has been 
childless, the other spouse already has had one child or two children, (4) one spouse or 
both Chinese spouses returned from overseas, Hong Kong or Taiwan, and (5) one spouse 
or both spouses are single children” (Scharping 2003: 100-101).  Ningxia’s conditions 
for second births are even broader: (1-5) same as above, “(6) one spouse or both spouses 
belong to a national minority with less than 10 million members, and (7) one spouse has 
been constantly working in underground mining for more than 5 years” (Scharping 
2003: 100-101).  This flexibility is needed since China is so large; however, it can also 
work against the fundamental objectives of the policy.   
According to the 2000 census, the TFR for China was 1.22—well below 2.1—the 
replacement level of fertility.  However, the country’s TFR fluctuated spatially with 
rates of .86, 1.08, and 1.43, for city, town, and rural areas, respectively.  The TFR varied 
from a low of .67 in Beijing to a high of 2.19 in Guizhou Province.  While plunging birth 
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rates in nearly all provinces suggest that program resistance is abating, widening intra-
province differentials indicate that “pockets of resistance are hardening” (Attane 2001: 
74).   
Most investigations of China’s TFR have been conducted at the provincial level, 
which cannot account for intra-province differentials.  For instance, the 2000 TFR for 
urban Guizhou was 1.31, whereas the TFR for rural Guizhou was 2.42.  When one takes 
into consideration all the one-child certificate holders, all the officially exempt second 
births, as well as all the unexcused out-of-quota births, it is easy to fathom how the TFR 
can vary across the country.  The question is why?  Why does the TFR vary?  Do social, 
economic, political, cultural, and environmental factors play a part in this variation?  
Research indicates that the answer is yes—different dynamics influence whether family 
planning efforts are met with acceptance or resistance—yielding inconsistencies in the 
birth rate across China. 
In order to understand the nation’s current demographic conditions and to better 
evaluate the efficacy of China’s family planning program, these disparities need to be 
located and analyzed.  My thesis will explore this issue by examining the variation in the 
TFR among the counties of China.  While family planning activities are vastly 
responsible for the fertility decline across China, my thesis will not include an analysis 
of the program itself.  Rather, I will focus on socioeconomic indicators, which often lead 
to differences in policy enforcement and success (Poston and Gu 1987).  I will generate 
and test a mixture of sociological and demographic explanations of the variation in the 
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TFR, drawing primarily from demographic transition theory (DTT).  At present, this 
type of analysis has not been performed using the 2000 census data.     
In past research, socioeconomic, political, cultural, and environmental factors 
were often associated with Chinese fertility, and some had more impact than others.  
Areas with the lowest fertility tended to be urban, with more economic development, and 
greater gender equality with regards to educational and occupational status.  Remote 
border areas which rely on agricultural production, tended to have the highest fertility.  
These areas are rural, contain a large concentration of minority groups, and have greater 
gender disparity with regards to educational and occupational status.   
I expect that my analysis will yield similar findings.  My general hypothesis is 
that social and economic development is negatively related to fertility.  Thus, I expect 
areas with greater levels of social and economic development to have lower levels of 
fertility.  This hypothesis clearly echoes DTT, which posits that lowered mortality and 
lowered fertility arise out of socioeconomic development.  As Minister Peng Peiyun 
stated herself in 1988, the population problem “is an important one, which is related to 
the overall economic and social development…” (Peiyun 1988; Hardee-Cleaveland and 
Banister 1988: 251). 
I will now address specific socioeconomic variables and their hypothesized 
relationship with fertility among the counties of China.  Variables such as ethnicity, 
agricultural detachment, urbanization, economic conditions, cultural norms and gender 
differences in illiteracy rates are expected to be related to the total fertility rate.  Most of 
my expectations are in accordance with DTT or previous studies of Chinese fertility.   
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 Cultural differences and frequent immunity from the one-child policy generate 
higher fertility among minority groups.  Therefore, I hypothesize that counties with a 
lower percentage of minority population will have lower fertility rates. 
 The percentage of non-agricultural population in each county is expected to be 
negatively associated with fertility.  In other words, a higher percentage of non-
agricultural population should result in a lower total fertility rate.  Other socioeconomic 
variables, such as urbanization and economic progress, are also expected to be 
negatively related to the total fertility rates. 
 Gender differences in illiteracy rates are anticipated to have positive associations 
with the total fertility rates.  In other words, gender bias tends to result in higher fertility.  
Education is known to be negatively associated with fertility; thus overall illiteracy 
(males and females combined) is expected to be positively associated with fertility. 
 Census 2000 provides data on household structure (i.e. number of generations 
within a family unit) and divorce rates, which may expose the presence of traditional 
family norms.  Traditional family norms and cultural values are expected to be positively 
related to fertility as well. 
 This thesis has several strengths.  Data limitations caused problems and 
frustrations for Chinese demographers in past decades.  I am fortunate to be working 
with Census 2000, which has been applauded for its addendum of short-form and long-
form questionnaires.  As mentioned above, there are two predictors which are intended 
to expose the presence of traditional family norms and cultural values.  These predictors 
are the percentage divorced and the percentage of one generation family households.  
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Census 2000 is the first census to provide data on these issues; thus, previous studies of 
Chinese fertility have not been afforded such predictors in their models.  I am eager to 
see their relative impact on fertility among the counties of China. 
  In anticipation of this thesis, I conducted a preliminary analysis of the variation 
in the TFR among the counties of Sichuan Province.  Sichuan Province, commonly 
referred to as “the Texas of China,” is geographically one of the largest provinces in the 
nation, encompassing an area of 485,000 square kilometers.  This province contains 180 
counties and has the largest population in China, with 87 million people.  The analysis 
allowed me to identify and solve some methodological problems in advance, and also 
lent support to my hypotheses, serving as a spring board for my thesis.   
 Just as there are strengths, there are also weaknesses.  My analysis could be 
vastly improved if it were possible to include an indicator addressing per capita income.  
Census 2000 does not ask such information, so I am limited in this way by the data.  I 
would also like to incorporate a few family planning variables, since the family planning 
program has such a tremendous impact on fertility in China, apart from and in 
conjunction with socioeconomic factors.  For instance, an independent variable 
pertaining to family planning costs might be especially helpful, since wealthier 
jurisdictions are at an advantage when it comes to birth restriction.  Not only are their 
clinics better equipped, they are able to offer greater financial incentives to couples 
accepting the one-child certificate.  Additionally, it would be interesting to include an 
indicator of abortion frequency, since abortions are often used to meet the birth planning 
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targets.  Census 2000 provides no data on family planning activities; so again, I am 
confined in this respect. 
 The subsequent chapter addresses pertinent literature regarding DTT, and 
reviews previous studies of Chinese fertility and their findings.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In this chapter, a detailed review of seven Chinese fertility studies, spanning 
nearly two decades of time, will be presented.  Each of these studies investigated the 
impact of various socioeconomic factors on China’s fertility decline and geographical 
fluctuations.  Prior to reviewing these analyses, a brief account of demographic 
transition theory (DTT) will be provided, together with my rationale for using it as the 
theoretical framework in this thesis.   
Demographic Transition Theory 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were a number of 
conjectures regarding the recent fertility declines in the West (Hirschman 1994).  Some 
believed that the improved diets of industrial life had diminished the reproductive 
capacity of women (Notestein 1953).  This theory fell short, since urban women who did 
not contracept could conceive as effortlessly as their ancestors two hundred years prior.  
Others attributed the decline to the creation of modern contraceptive methods.  This 
interpretation also failed, since the movement toward fertility decline was already in 
progress before modern methods had any noticeable significance.  Demographers, 
particularly Warren Thompson (1929), stressed the importance of social and economic 
factors in prompting fertility decline.  These notions took shape over the following 
decades and materialized in the 1940s as Demographic Transition Theory (DTT)—
chiefly the effort of Frank Notestein (Hirschman 1994; Notestein 1945, 1953). 
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 In essence, demographic transition theory (DTT) posits that lowered mortality 
and lowered fertility arise out of socioeconomic development.  As a society becomes 
industrialized, traditional belief systems are replaced by an alternative set of “motivating 
factors,” which result in a succession of new behaviors, one being deliberate fertility 
control (Hirschman 1994; Notestein 1953).   
According to Notestein, some of the motivating factors responsible for the 
fertility decline in Western Europe and North America were “reduced…pressures toward 
traditional behavior,” “new opportunities for individual advancement,” “education and a 
rational point of view,” “the cost of child-rearing grew and…economic contributions by 
children declined,” “falling death-rates…lowered the inducements to have many births,” 
and that “women…found new independence from household obligations and new 
economic roles less compatible with child-rearing” (Notestein 1953: 16). 
Various demographers have put different spins on DTT.  For Kingsley Davis 
(1963), the key independent variable is the degree of household economic strain, which 
is determined by household size and impending economic resources.  He believes that 
societies will engage in fertility control, along with a series of other behaviors, to relieve 
the economic strain associated with modernization and mortality reductions.  Ansley 
Coale’s (1973) perspective is more specific.  He set down three conditions essential for 
the decline of marital fertility: “(1) a setting that allowed for fertility planning to be part 
of the calculus of conscious choice, (2) the availability of effective information about the 
means to control fertility, and (3) clear economic advantages of fertility control” 
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(Hirschman 1994: 212).  These opinions illuminate an important point about DTT: “it 
has room for every causal variable” (Hirschman 1994: 212).   
A number of empirical studies have endeavored to discredit DTT and for the last 
thirty years, it has faced considerable opposition (e.g. wealth-flows, economic, 
ideational, evolutionary, ecological).  According to Knodel and van de Walle (1979: 
219), “interpretations of the European fertility experience were based on a combination 
of hazy empirical impressions and theoretical preconceptions.”  Using a combination of 
micro, macro, and qualitative studies, these authors concluded that there was “no clear 
threshold of social and economic development required for the fertility transition to 
begin” (Knodel and van de Walle 1979: 225), since fertility declines appeared in 
countries with conflicting levels of socioeconomic development.   
Caldwell (1976) also disapproves of our sustained reliance upon DTT, as it has 
undergone negligible renovations to accommodate the new body of knowledge in this 
area.  His major criticism of DTT is the assumption that rationality accompanies 
industrial, urban society; hence, primitive societies are seen as irrational.  As stated by 
Caldwell (1979: 116) “the movement from a society characterized by economically 
unrestricted fertility to a society characterized by economically restricted fertility is 
essentially the product of social, rather than economic, change.”  He posits that mass 
education lowers fertility, by producing a reversal in the flow of wealth.  With education, 
female status goes up and children become more costly to raise; thus, the upward flow of 
wealth changes directions and begins to flow downward, from parent to child.   
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I agree with Caldwell’s position that mass education reduces fertility by 
increasing female status and the cost of children.  These educational affects are included 
in DTT and in other fertility theories that attribute low fertility to improvements in 
socioeconomic status.  However, I do not necessarily believe that these affects induce a 
U-turn in the flow of wealth.  Education is a given among variables negatively impacting 
fertility decline.  The reasons it works the way it does can easily be argued, but the 
outcome is the same.  I tend to agree with Hillard Kaplan’s statement that “humans, like 
all other known organisms, invest in, rather than exploit, their offspring” (1994: 785); 
thus I tend to question Caldwell’s wealth-flows theory of fertility decline.  I believe that 
a shift occurs—children produce less than in the past and cost more—but historically, I 
do not think children have supported their parents to such an extent that there is a 
complete reversal (180 degrees) in the flow of wealth when the shift occurs.  
Additionally, in the London and Hadden (1989) study of Thailand, there was no attempt 
to measure the actual flow of wealth from child to parent or vice versa for obvious 
reasons—it is impossible to do.  Empirically, the wealth-flows model suffers, just like 
any other theories of fertility decline. 
 My questions about the wealth-flows model raise two important points, which 
help to justify my reliance upon DTT for this thesis.  (1) When researchers are 
investigating the utility of theories, their findings are guided by their hypotheses.  
Consequently, some empirical studies will find reason to question certain theories, such 
as DTT, because of their choice of predictors, models, or methods.  (2) Fertility is very 
difficult to measure quantitatively and it is even harder to predict.  Fertility theories 
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which sanction more freedom in the way of predictors, therefore, stand a better chance 
of survival. 
 In reflecting on those points, DTT has endured a flood of criticism over the last 
three decades, but the theory “has ideas that are hard to ignore and …live on” (Mason 
1997: 444).  Classic DTT allows for a great degree of latitude because of the way in 
which it was originally crafted.  The broad scope of DTT allows researchers to test out a 
variety of variables in a multitude of ways—a quality which has sustained its viability 
for half a century.  “There is no consensus on an alternative theory to replace 
demographic transition theory” (Hirschman 1994: 214) because no other theories offer 
such elasticity.  Thus, DTT remains the most widely accepted theoretical framework, 
and for the purposes of my thesis, will serve me best (Hirschman 1994). 
 As I noted earlier, DTT does not have a standard suite of predictor variables 
intended for fertility decline.  Thus, the major challenge for researchers has been the 
selection of variables.  This poses an even bigger problem for demographers studying 
China who are working with a very unique population undergoing an unprecedented 
fertility transition.  The fertility reductions that have occurred in industrialized countries 
may well be fundamentally different from the reduction that has occurred in China.  One 
obvious difference is that China is still a developing country, with much of its traditional 
belief system intact, yet it displays a TFR of 1.22.  The second distinction is the one-
child policy.  While the policy is not solely responsible for the fertility reduction, it has 
been important in why the TFR is so low.  Since the 1980s, researchers have worked to 
identify the variables most significantly associated with China’s fertility decline and 
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geographical fluctuations.  I will now provide a detailed overview of these studies and 
their findings. 
Chinese Fertility Studies 
 Birdsall and Jamison (1983) were the first demographers to address China’s 
fertility at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels.  In performing this study, they 
hoped to shed light on whether or not future economic growth and freedom could be 
expected to strengthen or weaken the government policy to reduce fertility.  They 
suspected the effects of socioeconomic conditions and government programs to interact 
with one another; thus, they believed family planning programs would be more 
successful in places where socioeconomic conditions bolstered government objectives.   
Due to a lack of data, they could not test the extent to which birth planning inputs 
triggered fertility change in different regions of the country.  However, they did have 
data on which of the 29 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities had activated 
an explicit program of incentives and disincentives to deter births by 1979.  Using cross-
sectional data on income and other markers of socioeconomic development, and on 
incentives, they estimated a series of Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression models. 
To the degree that the birth planning inputs were uncorrelated with the socioeconomic 
markers and with the incentive variable, their effects were integrated into the 
unexplained residual. 
Their multivariate study of the crude birth rate engendered three main 
conclusions which I will now address.  First, they found that different levels of fertility 
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are associated with different levels of development.  China adheres to the common 
pattern: high-income areas are associated with lower levels of fertility.   
The rural income variable explained 45 percent of the variance in crude birth 
rates within a single province and income explained between 17 and 38 percent of the 
variance in the crude birth rates across provinces.  According to the authors, it is not 
income as such that reduces fertility.  Rather, there are probably a number of unspecified 
variables that are correlated with income—like educational status and wage rates and 
career prospects for women—that more immediately impact fertility by raising the cost 
of children to parents.  They believe that if they could control for these variables, the 
effect of income on fertility would be positive.  These results indicate that levels of 
development have considerable influence on China’s fertility, apart from the impact of 
the one-child policy.  Additionally, once income was controlled, urban variables had 
only a weak negative impact on fertility.  This seems to suggest that it is not urban 
residence per se that lowers fertility, but rather the higher income associated with urban 
residence.  Conversely, there may be more under-reporting of births in rural areas, which 
conceal the true rural-urban differences in fertility.  The incentive variable showed no 
direct effect on fertility, most likely because the program was only a few years old at the 
time of this study. 
Their second conclusion was that higher income not only resulted in lower 
fertility levels, it also engendered a greater degree of fertility decline between 1975 and 
1979 among the counties of Jiangsu Province.  
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 For their third and final conclusion, they discovered that the negative association 
between income and fertility weakened between 1975 and 1979.  The authors put forth a 
couple of explanations for this finding.  For one, crude birth rates were being depressed 
into a smaller range as they approached replacement-level fertility, thus reducing the 
explanatory strength of income.  Secondly, income may have played a larger role in 
reducing fertility prior to 1975 than it did between 1975 and 1979, since policy 
enforcement became more influential in the latter period.  Serious government efforts 
did not begin until 1972, and the initial effects (1972-75) of those efforts may have been 
more substantial in high-income areas where conditions were more favorable for fertility 
decline.  
 Tien (1984) carried out a succession of provincial level cross-sectional studies 
for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981, which investigated the relative impact of 
population planning programs and socio-economic development on China’s fertility 
transition.  He put forth four hypotheses to be tested: “(1) The higher the level of 
urbanization in a province, the lower is its fertility; (2) The higher total output per head 
in a province, the lower is its fertility; (3) The higher the grain output per head (i.e. 
higher economic well-being in an agrarian society) in a province, the lower is its 
fertility; (4) The higher the life expectancy at birth in a province, the lower is its 
fertility” (Tien 1984: 393).  According to Tien, grain output per head is undoubtedly the 
most revealing marker of individual and family welfare in China, since the majority of 
the population is reliant upon agriculture for income and survival.   
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 His provincial level analyses were disadvantaged by data problems and 
deficiencies.  Still, Tien was able to make a few generalizing statements about China’s 
fertility.  Fertility varied extensively but stayed high in the provinces prior to 1970, 
before the population planning measures were amplified.  Fertility began to decline after 
1970, but the progress was uneven during the period of program intensification.  The 
fertility differences among provinces prior to 1970 grew larger after the program 
augmentation, especially amid the urban and rural provinces.  Fertility appears to have 
increased between 1979 and 1981, probably because of transformations in age and 
marriage structure. 
 I will now address Tien’s results pertaining to socioeconomic variables and 
differential natural increase.  Prior to 1981, grain output per head had little influence 
over natural increase.  However, grain output per head was negatively and significantly 
associated with natural increase in 1981, after the changes were made which returned 
productive control to peasant households.  Tien speculates that where grain output is 
deficient, less money can be allocated to agricultural mechanization and old age 
retirement; thus, the motivation to have more children is greater in those places.   
He also found that urbanization, output per head, and life expectancy were all 
negatively and significantly related to natural increase.  Tien believes the correlations 
between the socioeconomic variables and natural increase would have been even higher, 
if the life expectancy variable had been eliminated from the model.  Given that monetary 
benefits are often used to reward couples who abide by the policy, Tien reasons that 
 22
 
wealthier provinces have an advantage over the others with regards to fertility 
restriction.   
Consequently, most of these findings lent support for his hypotheses.  Both 
socioeconomic change and government programs were crucial to China’s fertility 
transition, and justifications of this shift merit the inclusion of both factors.  Tien’s 
findings challenge the notion that China’s fertility decline was entirely the outcome of an 
extensive family planning program. 
Poston and Gu (1987) explored the interactions between socioeconomic 
development, family planning, and fertility among China’s 28 subregions, around 1982.  
In their model, they included 17 development variables, which exposed different social 
and economic characteristics of the subregions.  They grouped these variables into four 
separate indexes relating to structural development, female status, quality of life, and 
rural quality of life.  They also incorporated 11 family planning variables; ten were in 
regards to participant behavior and one was in regards to expenditures.  Their dependent 
variable was the total fertility rate. 
Their main objective was to determine the extent to which socioeconomic factors 
and family planning behavior influenced fertility change and decline among the 
subregions.  They hypothesized that both socioeconomic development variables and 
family planning variables would be negatively associated with fertility among the 
subregions during this period of analysis.  They also hypothesized that socioeconomic 
development variables would have an indirect negative effect on fertility via the family 
planning variables.  Their results substantiated these conjectures.  All of the variables 
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were negatively associated with fertility, although their relative effects differed 
appreciably.  
Poston and Gu found that certain aspects of socioeconomic development and 
family planning behavior had large direct negative effects on fertility.  Additionally, they 
discovered that some socioeconomic factors had indirect effects on fertility via family 
planning behavior, the largest of which was the female status index.  In regards to the 
family planning variables, they found that contraceptive behavior had a large direct 
negative effect on fertility, while family planning costs had a relatively weak effect on 
fertility.   
Poston and Gu’s findings support earlier studies (Tien 1984; Birdsall and 
Jamison 1983) suggesting that socioeconomic development has a direct effect on 
fertility, apart from family planning efforts.  Their results also correspond to other 
studies (Kelly et al. 1983; Mauldin et al. 1978) showing that specific aspects of 
development effect fertility through contraceptive behavior.   
In brief, their results indicate that China’s fertility transition should not be 
attributed exclusively to family planning programs.  Socioeconomic development has 
had a hand in this shift, affecting fertility both directly and indirectly, and these effects 
should be considered in any empirical investigation of China’s fertility decline.  
While the Chinese government has been successful in circulating fertility policies 
throughout the country, its policy control is indirect and must operate through local units 
(Freedman et al. 1988).  Thus, the initiation, enforcement, and success of these policies 
are highly dependent upon local units of control.  Due to wavering local conditions and 
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resource availability, the ultimate outcomes of central policies are greatly inconsistent, 
not only across, but within provinces.  Freedman et al. (1988) wished to throw light on 
this issue by examining reproductive behavior in local communities, simultaneously 
revealing the degree of variability in fertility within provinces.  They performed a vast 
investigation of China’s fertility 1973-1982, probing data from 815 production brigades 
(now administrative villages). 
Using data from the 1/1000 Survey for China, they constructed and analyzed 
three-year fertility rates for each woman in the sample.  They studied four provinces in 
detail (Hebei, Henan, Liaoning and Sichuan), which differ noticeably in socioeconomic 
development, and which constitute one-fourth of China’s population.  Efforts were 
centered on rural, rather than urban units, since rural units are more plentiful and vary 
more by education and fertility levels.   
They discovered that markers of reproductive behavior fluctuated appreciably 
among different production brigades, especially in rural areas.  For instance, there was 
substantial deviation among the rural production brigades in age at marriage.  In Hebei 
alone, the proportions married prior to age 23 contrasted from around 15 percent to 95 
percent.  Also relevant, were the proportions of first births taking place after the 
initiation of the one-child policy.  “The percentage of production brigades in which the 
proportion of first births was 40 or more is 75 for Hebei, 46 for Henan, 64 for Liaoning, 
and 73 for Sichuan” (Freedman et al. 1988: 44).  
Additionally, they examined the predominance of various contraceptive methods 
in the four provinces and in the country as a whole and found greater variation between 
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production brigades than between provinces.  Regarding abortion ratios 
(100*abortions/births), there was significant variation between and within provinces, and 
the highest abortion ratios occurred in the urban sectors of each province.   
The single explanatory variable accessible from the 1/1000 Survey was education 
of women.  They found evidence of macro and micro educational effects on fertility, 
although these effects varied among provinces and transpired at different times.  It seems 
that in Liaoning, the educational milieu of the units had an enormous impact on the 
women’s fertility level, irrespective of the women’s own education.  The authors believe 
these macro educational effects may have been a consequence of other variables not 
included in the study or an outcome of using expansive educational categories.  The 
urban fertility rates of Liaoning and Sichuan were much lower than those of the rural 
units at every educational level, which suggests the family planning program was 
already operative in urban areas between 1973 and 1976.   
In 1973-6, the usual negative relationship between individual education and total 
fertility was not observed with any uniformity for local areas, and it was not observed at 
all in urban areas.  Even more salient is the finding that the macro-educational effect was 
gone by 1979-82.  In other words, the fertility of rural women was essentially unaffected 
by the illiteracy level of their brigade.  Moreover, the negative association between 
individual education and fertility existed in just two out of the four rural micro-education 
groups, and did not exist at all in urban areas. 
Their study suggests that China’s family planning program has surmounted many 
obstacles caused by low educational levels; however, micro-education disparities in 
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fertility have continued to exist in rural areas.  There is extreme variation among the 
production brigades in terms of illiteracy levels—ranging from just 3 percent illiteracy to 
between 80 and 100 percent.  This variability is important to consider, since educational 
levels are often related to other socio-economic variables.  Most noteworthy, is that this 
study did not champion the notion that China’s demographic changes are entirely the 
outcome of a family planning program.   
China’s TFR fell by over 50 percent in one decade (1970-1980); however, the 
timing and pace of the transition was erratic across the country.  Peng (1989) believed a 
great deal of this variation could be explained by way of the major determinants (e.g. 
socioeconomic and institutional aspects) of the country’s fertility transition.  
Accordingly, he used the 1982 national fertility survey to examine specific 
socioeconomic effects on fertility among China’s 28 provinces. 
 Peng tested the effect of education on fertility and found that the number of 
children ever born to women drops continuously with rising education.  Women with 
zero education always had the greatest number of children, whereas women with high 
school education or better had the smallest number of children.  The mean parities of 
illiterate women were 20 percent higher than those with a junior middle-school 
education and 36 percent higher than those with a high school or higher education. 
 As one would expect, the number of children born to urban women was lower 
than the number born to rural women.  Even when education and province location were 
held constant, Peng found urban women aged 35 to have 30 percent less children than 
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their rural counterparts.  Moreover, the effect of rural-urban on fertility appears stronger 
for the younger age groups than the effect of education. 
 Peng also found occupation to be a key determinant of women’s reproductive 
behavior.  He compared fertility among four occupational groups (i.e. peasant, worker, 
cadre, and housewife) and uncovered large occupational discrepancies.  Working women 
and cadres had fewer children than peasant women and housewives, which could be 
attributed to differences in work schedules.  Generally, peasants had more children than 
any other group, whereas cadres had fewer children than any other group. 
Peng discovered that fertility levels vacillated among provinces, primarily 
between the eastern and western parts of the country.  Fertility tended to be lowest in the 
east, highest in the west, and approximately the national average in the middle section of 
the country.   
For the most part, these findings are analogous to previous studies.  The family 
planning program “has not operated in a vacuum;” many socioeconomic factors have 
influenced and continue to influence China’s fertility shift.  
Poston and Jia (1990) were among the first demographers to conduct an 
extensive county level Chinese fertility analysis.  Using data from the 1982 Census of 
China they investigated and compared the impact of four independent variables (i.e. 
economic development, the infant mortality rate (IMR), the illiteracy rate, and the 
percentage of industrial employees) on the general fertility rate (GFR) in 2306 counties.  
Their goal was to determine the influence of pertinent socioeconomic factors on fertility 
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transition, and the degree to which this influence varied among counties in different 
regions of the country.  
Their dependent variable was the general fertility rate (GFR).  In evaluating its 
means and standard deviations, they discovered that there was considerable variability 
about the average GFR value of 98.5.  It ranged from a low of 36.2 in Shihizhi city in the 
Xinjiang autonomous region to a high of 232.5 in Butuo county in Sichuan province.  
They also found that the GFR in 1981 varied much more among the counties of China 
than among the provinces.  As expected, the average GFR in rural counties (102) was 
substantially higher than in the urban counties (68). 
As mentioned above, four independent variables were used.  The first is an 
economic index, which signifies the “gross value of industrial and agricultural output per 
head (in yuan) in 1982” (Poston and Jia 1990: 508).  The range of this index is rather 
impressive—extending from a low of 70Y in Haiyuan county in the Ningxia 
autonomous region to a high of 28,475Y in the Yanshan district of Beijing.   
The second predictor is the infant mortality rate (IMR) in 1981, which had a 
mean value of 39.0 (SD 29.1) among the 2,306 counties included in the study.  The IMR 
ranged from a low of 6 in Langfang city in Hebei Province to a high of 319 in 
DaQaidam county in Qinghai province. 
The third predictor is the illiteracy rate, “the percentage of the population aged 
12 or over in the county in 1982 that is illiterate or semi-literate; a literate person knows 
at least 1500 Chinese characters, can read simple books and newspapers, and can write 
simple messages” (Poston and Jia 1990: 510; Beijing Review 1984).  This independent 
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variable had an average value of 34.1 (SD 13.9), ranging from a low of 2.7% in 
Lianjiang county in Guangdong province to a high of 84.9% in Dongxiang county in 
Gansu province.   
The fourth and final independent variable is the percentage of industrial 
employees in the labor force in 1982.  This predictor had a mean value of 13.3 (SD 
14.6), spanning from a low of 0.1% in Jishishan county of Gansu province to a high of 
76.9% in the Yanshan district of Beijing.  All four of the independent variables showed 
great variation among the counties of China; subsequently, they influenced fertility at 
varying degrees.  I will now address their findings. 
Of the four socioeconomic markers, they found the IMR to have the largest and 
most significant effect on fertility amid all of the counties, and amid the urban and rural 
counties evaluated independently.  Their investigation of the rural counties showed that 
the four independent variables have different effects on different regions of the country.  
In Dongbei and Xibei, the IMR has the most significant impact on fertility, in Huabei 
and Xinan, the illiteracy rate has the most significant impact, and lastly, for Huadong 
and Zhongnan, the economic index has the most significant impact on fertility.  These 
findings reinforce prior provincial level analyses linking socioeconomic factors to 
Chinese fertility trends. 
Poston (2000) conducted cross-sectional studies of China and Taiwan using 
subregional data at two time periods, the early 1980s and 1990.  His main purpose was 
to investigate the degree to which social and economic development stimulated fertility 
reductions in each of the countries.  Both China and Taiwan have undergone drastic 
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fertility transitions over the past 40 years—their TFRs dropping from 6 in the early 
1950s to less than 2 by 1997.  Yet, different sets of events may have triggered the 
transitions for each of these countries.  Taiwan, as a whole, experienced the transition 
earlier than China.  Many researchers believe that Taiwan’s fertility decline was due 
largely to socioeconomic development, since involvement in the country’s family 
planning programs has always been voluntary.  Conversely, China’s fertility decline is 
believed to have been generated by both socioeconomic development and its family 
planning programs, since involvement in the latter has been more or less mandatory. 
He explored the link between socioeconomic development and fertility “by using 
data for the counties and provinces of China for 1982, 1990, and 1995; and for the 
counties and cities of Taiwan for 1980, 1990, and 1995” (Poston 2000: 41).  This study 
is different from other investigations of this nature because of its subregional focus.   
In conducting his analyses, Poston regards four factors as having especially 
significant effects on fertility: “(1) advances in economic development, specifically 
increases in economic productivity and participation in the nonagricultural labor force; 
(2) improvements in general health conditions, especially reductions in infant mortality; 
(3) improvements in social conditions and livelihood, particularly in educational 
attainment; and (4) absolute and relative improvements in female status” (Poston 2000: 
43).  Previous studies have found links between one or more of these factors and fertility 
decline in China and in Taiwan.  I will now provide a synopsis of his analyses and 
findings for China. 
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In his analysis of the fertility trends among China’s counties in 1982, the general 
fertility rate (GFR) served as the dependent variable.  The GFR had a mean value of 98 
in 1981 among the 2,300 counties included in the study, ranging from a low of 36 to a 
high of 233.  He found three out of his four independent variables—the infant mortality 
rate (IMR) in 1981 (+), the illiteracy rate in 1982 (+), and the percentage of industrial 
employees in the 1982 labor force (-)—to be significantly related to fertility in the 
hypothesized direction (in parentheses above). The infant mortality rate was the most 
influential predictor and his model accounted for nearly 43 percent of the variation in the 
GFR in 1982. 
The general fertility rate (GFR) again served as the dependent variable in 
Poston’s 1990 analysis, and as in 1982, varied greatly among the counties of China.  The 
GFR had an average value of 91, spanning from a low of 35 in Jiading District in 
Shanghai to a high of 210 in Cuoqin County in Tibet.  The results for the 1990 multiple 
regression equation were similar to those for 1982.  Illiteracy and the crude death rate 
(CDR) had significant positive effects on fertility, while industry had a significant 
negative effect.  Illiteracy and industry were the most important predictors and his model 
accounted for 38 percent of the variation in the GFR in 1990. 
The results from his provincial level analyses also indicate that social and 
economic development has played a role in determining Chinese fertility patterns.  
Poston hypothesized that the illiteracy and infant mortality variables would be positively 
related to fertility, whereas the income and life expectancy variables would be negatively 
related to fertility.  All four of his equations showed income and infant mortality to be 
 32
 
significantly related to fertility in the hypothesized direction.  The effect of income was 
strongest in two of the equations, while the effect of infant mortality was strongest in the 
other two.  The life expectancy and illiteracy variables did not excel in any of the 
models, an issue possibly attributable to measurement problems.  
Although Poston faced various multicollinearity problems regarding the 
predictors in his fertility analysis of Taiwan, he found evidence that social and economic 
development were important factors in the country’s fertility decline. 
According to these results, socioeconomic factors have impacted fertility in 
China and Taiwan to comparable degrees, in spite of the fact that Taiwan is more 
developed than China.  Poston credits China’s extensive fertility-control polices, 
however, for bringing its fertility rate down to the level of Taiwan’s over such a short 
period of time.  His findings underpin prior analyses relating socioeconomic factors to 
Chinese fertility patterns, and also lend support to demographic transition theory of 
fertility decline. 
The aforementioned studies, spanning nearly twenty years time, have established 
various connections between aspects of socioeconomic development and fertility decline 
in China.  Although scholars often question the soundness of DTT, I agree with Poston 
(2000: 58) that “these results provide confirming evidence that a social and economic 
development-based theory of fertility decline, as represented by the broader theory of 
demographic transition, continues to have considerable relevance for understanding 
variation in fertility among the subregions of China.” 
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So as to determine which aspects of socioeconomic development wield the most 
power over fertility in China, it is essential to analyze fertility trends across the nation. 
This thesis is an analysis of the variation in the TFR among 2,873 Chinese counties, 
based on the 2000 Population Census of China.  In accordance with previous studies of 
Chinese fertility, I will consider the contribution of both socioeconomic status and 
gender differences in shaping fertility trends.  I will also examine the relationship 
between traditional family norms and fertility.   In the next chapter, I will present a 
discussion of the data and methods to be used in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 Chapter III provides a thorough description of the 2000 census of China, and also 
addresses the benefits and downfalls of using it as the solitary data source for this thesis.  
Additionally, the dependent variable and each of my independent variables will be 
operationalized.  In doing so, I explain my reasoning for including them in the study and 
also attend to individual measurement issues.  And finally the statistical methods to be 
used in my fertility analysis will be dealt with one at a time in considerable detail.  
Data 
 The data source for my thesis is the 2000 Population Census of China—
“arguably the world’s most ambitious census ever” (Kennedy 2001: 1)—entailing 
“10,000 tons of paper for questionnaires, 5 million enumerators, and a million 
supervisors” (Lavely 2001: 755).”   
 Work on the census began at 00:00 hours on November 1st in the year 2000, 
which by the Confucian calendar was the year 4698.  This was the Fifth National Census 
of the People’s Republic of China and the first count in ten years.  Government officials, 
teachers, and volunteers were utilized in the endeavor, visiting over 350 million families 
across the country (Landsberger n.d.).  Ninety percent of the families were interviewed 
using a short-form questionnaire and each exchange lasted approximately ten minutes 
(Weaver 2000).  Encounters were more time-consuming for the other ten percent who 
were interviewed using a long-form questionnaire.  While the census period was 
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scheduled to last ten days, 10 million missing Hunan residents compelled the Chinese 
Government to prolong the project by almost a week (Daily Reports 2001). 
One of the most constructive changes in Census 2000 is that the data cannot be 
used to evaluate the functioning of local governments (Chan 2003).  Generally, 
government statistics are used to assess policy implementation, which creates a situation 
that is inhospitable to accurate reporting.  The State Council decision to safe-guard the 
data in this way was an effort to secure a more valid account of China’s current 
demography.   
Census 2000 has been commended for its use of short-form and long-form 
questionnaires, which provide rich data for a wide-range of prospective research projects 
(Chan 2003).  Moreover, it is the first census in thirty years to introduce a “zanzhu 
renkou (‘temporary population’) form to record this population (the length of stay was 
reduced to less than six months), whereas the remaining, ‘ordinary resident’ population 
(changzhu renkou) was recorded in the regular census form” (Chan 2003).  This 
incorporation will be beneficial for my thesis research because it has been hypothesized 
that many out-of-quota births are children of the “floating population.” 
Census 2000 has also been highly praised for using a more liberal definition of 
“urban” than was used in the past (Lavely 2001; Kennedy 2001).  Whereas earlier 
censuses automatically counted village committees as rural, Census 2000 avoided such 
robotic classifications.  The urban definition employed in the 2000 census bestows 
village committees urban status on the basis of density measures and other benchmarks 
(Lavely 2001).  Furthermore, rural migrants who had resided in an urban area for over 
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six months were labeled urban residents in the census, regardless of their household 
registration status (Kennedy 2001).  The 2000 census reveals a national urbanization rate 
of 36 percent—five percentage points higher than the rate obtained from urban 
registration data in 1999 (31 percent).  This means Census 2000 captured 67 million 
more urban residents on account of the broader classification system (Lavely 2001; 
Kennedy 2001).  
One downfall of Census 2000 is its estimated undercount rate of 1.81% (22.46 
million), a rate higher than that of the previous censuses (Chan 2003).  Experts have 
attributed this problem to a variety of factors.  First, it could indicate that the population 
is more “diverse and mobile” than it was in previous censuses.  Additionally, there may 
be more under-reporting of “above-quota birth” children, as well as homeless and 
nomadic sex workers.  Third, it could be that many people gave erroneous answers or 
omitted some of the questions, either advertently or inadvertently (Chan 2003). 
 The superior quality of former Chinese censuses stemmed from a rigid household 
registration system and strong ties connecting the registers with the census (Lavely 
2001).  The connection between registration and census work is overt and direct.  During 
the period immediately preceding a census, the household registers are revised and 
authenticated in a process called “rectification” (zhengdun) (Lavely 2001: 764).  The 
local officials then hand the polished registers over to the enumerators, who use them to 
put together a list of households in the enumeration districts.  Since the enumerator is 
provided with information on each household prior to the household interview, the 
interview is a rough check of the registration information. 
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Census 2000 was performed under less auspicious circumstances.  The household 
registers are not as accurate as in the past because policy requirements have led to an 
extensive falsification of local population conditions (Lavely 2001).  For instance, pre-
census rectification uncovered 50,000 and 130,000 deceased persons left on the registers 
in Wenzhou city and Chongquing Municipality, respectively.  While these mistakes were 
rectified, “it is far easier to purge registers of the dead than it is to add the living” 
(Lavely 2001: 764).  Above-quota birth children are frequently excluded or hidden from 
the register since both citizens and officials are motivated to conceal them.  Parents hide 
surplus births to evade fines, while local birth planning officials (cadres) conceal them to 
convey the appearance of successful job performance (Lavely 2001).   
In order to safeguard census work “census officials directed that all unregistered 
out-of-plan children be registered, that no fines be collected from parents of these 
children, and that officials be granted amnesty for previous birth planning falsifications 
as long as they were truthfully reported in the census” (Lavely 2001: 764).  Similar 
guarantees were made before the 1990 census, only to be broken soon after (Kennedy 
2001).  Chinese remembered these infringements, which prevented them from coming 
forth in 2000.  What is more, local reports suggest that many who did disclose excess 
births in 2000 were indeed penalized.  “In some cases, the fines were reduced or 
eliminated, only to be replaced by ‘child registration fees’,” as indicated by a follow-up 
in Beijing (Kennedy 2001: 2).    
 Undoubtedly, there was a great propensity for error in Census 2000.  Rumors of 
gigantic undercounts in the media, however, were probably overstated and due to 
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confusion surrounding the enumeration of out-of-province migrants (Lavely 2001).  
“The enormous amounts of data from the Census 2000 are no doubt a gold mine for 
interested scholars, but there will also be more work, and more challenges, ahead if we 
wish to use them properly and fully” (Chan 2003: 7). 
Results from the 2000 census indicate that China maintained its position as the 
most populated nation with 1.266 billion persons, or roughly 21 percent of the earth’s 
population (Lavely 2001; Kennedy 2001).  The government’s target ceiling of 1.3 billion 
for the year 2000 was realized.   
The country’s population has matured slightly over the last ten years—the 
proportion 65 and older increasing by 1.4 percent (5.6 to 7.0).  Nevertheless, China 
remains quite young and boasts a sizeable workforce, as 70 percent of the population 
falls into the 15-64-year age bracket (Lavely 2001).   
Operationalization 
This thesis will analyze one dependent variable among the 2,873 Chinese 
counties: the total fertility rate (TFR).  The TFR is calculated by adding up the age 
specific fertility rates (ASFRs), and multiplying the sum by the width of the age interval 
of the ASFRs.  Typically, ASFRs are based on five-year intervals, so the sum is 
multiplied by 5.  The TFR value can be understood as signifying the total number of live 
births an artificial cohort of 1,000 women would end up having if, as they survived 
through their 35 years of childbearing, they were exposed to the ASFRs of a county in 
China in 2000.   
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Previous Chinese studies have utilized a variety of fertility measures, including 
the crude birth rate (CBR), the general fertility rate (GFR), and the TFR.  The GFR and 
TFR are usually preferred over the CBR since they are more statistically refined.  The 
CBR stays true to its name, given that its denominator is the entire midyear population, 
which contains a large number of people who are not at the risk of childbearing.  The 
GFR is superior to the CBR in this respect because its denominator is limited to women 
of childbearing age (the numerators of these two rates are identical: the number of births 
in year z).  Still, the GFR suffers because it does not account for age-related fertility 
fluctuations.  That is to say, women in their 20s will usually have higher fertility rates 
than women in their 40s.  If at all possible, we should allow for these disparities in our 
fertility calculations.  The TFR satisfies this need because it is based on the ASFRs, and 
when data is permitting, demographers typically rely on the measure for this reason. 
 In recent years, there has been some skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the 
conventional TFR in lowest-low fertility populations.  According to Sobotka (2004) and 
others (see Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002), the postponement of fertility is depressing 
the period fertility rates in the lowest-low fertility countries.  This tempo effect distorts 
the conventional TFR in that there is a supposed “recovery” of the TFR at the end of the 
fertility postponement.  Thus, Sobotka believes lowest-low fertility is caused by 
increasing age at motherhood—a temporary trend that will disappear once postponement 
comes to a halt.  I concur that this is problem in many European populations where the 
mean age at first birth is very high (i.e. 28-30 years of age); however, I do not believe it 
poses much of a problem in China since childbirth generally occurs shortly after 
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marriage (i.e. 23-25 years of age).  I am confident that the TFR is the superior choice of 
measurement for my county-level analysis of fertility in China. 
 Earlier analyses have incorporated an assortment of independent variables to 
capture the influence of socioeconomic development and modernization on fertility 
patterns in China (Birdsall and Jamison 1983; Freedman et al. 1988; Peng 1989; Poston 
2000; Poston and Gu 1987; Poston and Jia 1990; Tien 1984).  It is important to 
remember that, while variable selection is guided by theoretical concepts, it is 
constrained by the information provided in the data source.  Data limitations created 
many obstacles for demographers studying Chinese fertility in previous decades.  Census 
2000 was developed to address several pressing social and economic concerns in the 
country; thusly, I have more freedom in the way of variable selection.  Nevertheless, the 
confines of the data prevent me from including several pertinent variables in this thesis.   
 I will now address the operationalization of the ten independent variables in my 
study.  All of my independent variables concern the 2,873 counties of China in the year 
2000.  [For sake of simplicity, I will not restate this for each independent variable.]   
 Three variables measure urbanization and economic progress among the counties 
of China:  the percentage of the total population that is urban (i.e. residing in an urban 
area as defined by the census), the percentage of the total population that is employed in 
non-agricultural related work, and the percentage of the total employed population that is 
employed in white-collar work (i.e. professionals, associate professionals, managers, and 
administrators).  As maintained by DTT and a myriad of demographic studies, 
urbanization is positively related to socioeconomic status, and both urbanization and 
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socioeconomic status are negatively related to fertility.  These independent variables 
attend to these issues nicely, by measuring the variation among the counties in levels of 
development and modes of employment.  I expect all three of them to be negatively 
related to fertility. 
  Three variables measure the presence or absence of rudimentary education in an 
area:  the percentage of the total male population aged 15 and over that is illiterate, the 
percentage of the total female population aged 15 and over that is illiterate, and the 
percentage of the total (male and female) population aged 15 and over that is illiterate.  
Since education has been shown to have a negative impact on fertility, I anticipate that 
each of these illiteracy variables will be positively associated with fertility.   
I employed the male and female illiteracy variables to create a female status 
variable measuring educational inequality.  The percentage female illiterate divided by 
the percentage male illiterate will produce such an indicator, since it will expose gender 
bias in regards to basic educational standing.  Because women’s status has been found to 
have a negative relationship with fertility and since inequality lowers the status of 
women, I expect that my female status variable will be positively associated with 
fertility.  
It is common knowledge that rural areas have higher fertility rates than urban 
areas in China.  How do the seven variables I just mentioned play a part in the variation 
of fertility among urban and rural areas?  These variables not only influence fertility, 
they influence each other, which give rise to different dynamics, which change living 
conditions, which ultimately influence fertility again.  In other words, they not only have 
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a direct effect on fertility, they have an indirect effect on fertility via each other and 
outside forces.  I will now provide a little background in an effort to elucidate the urban-
rural fertility gap.  
China’s rural population numbers 866 million people.  The current one percent 
annual growth rate means we can expect it to increase by about 9 million per year 
(without rural-to-urban migration) (Johnson 2000).  Since rural areas have had higher 
birth rates in the past and are still slightly higher today, the rural labor force is 
overwhelming the job supply in the countryside.  Even as rural fertility rates continue to 
drop, this situation will worsen over the next few years on account of “population 
momentum”. 
Urban residents, especially in China, tend to have elevated education and income 
levels in comparison to their rural counterparts.  This is because there are simply more 
opportunities for individual advancement in urban areas.  According to Johnson (2000: 
332), “the major policy change that can be made to facilitate the required adjustment in 
the rural labor force is to equalize the educational opportunities between rural and urban 
areas.”  As it stands now, government officials are interfering with their own family 
planning and economic objectives by dumping a poor educational policy on the rural 
population.  Rural migrants searching for work in urban areas are disadvantaged because 
they lack the education necessary to attain employment.   
China’s cities cannot accommodate an ever-expanding, unemployed rural 
population; therefore, another favorable policy decision would be to invest in the 
development of rural areas (Johnson 2000).  Economic reforms over the last twenty 
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years have generated more nonagricultural jobs in rural areas, but it is insufficient when 
you consider that there are millions and millions of people who will soon be flooding the 
labor market.  This situation may well exacerbate an already substandard rural economy.    
In the case of China, the inferior socioeconomic conditions of rural areas help to 
explain their higher rates of fertility, but there is one more piece of the puzzle: son 
preference.  Rural couples are more likely to violate the one-child policy in an effort to 
achieve a son, whereas urban couples are not.  Son preference abounds throughout 
China, so why this contradiction?  While there may be social pressure, there is less 
financial pressure for urban residents to produce sons.  Urbanization has increased the 
educational and occupational standing of women, and in turn, the status of women has 
risen.  Furthermore the government is more generous with urban residents in terms of 
education and other key subsidies.  Quite the opposite, rural residents are primarily 
dependent upon sons for old age security. 
All of the independent variables I’ve cited influence fertility both directly and 
indirectly, promoting an urban-rural fertility gap.  I hope I was able to illuminate some 
of these interlocking issues for the reader. 
As I mentioned earlier, there are two independent variables which are intended to 
expose the presence of traditional family norms and cultural values.  These predictors 
are the percentage divorced and the percentage one generation family households.  
Census 2000 is the first census to ask questions about these issues.   
In regards to household information among the counties, Census 2000 provides 
data on the number of households, the number of people in family units, the number of 
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one-person household units, and the number of one, two, three, and four and over 
generation family units.  Extended families are linked to higher rates of fertility, while 
nuclear families are linked to lower rates of fertility.  I decided the best way to measure 
the variation among my counties in the number of nuclear families was through the 
percentage of one generation family households.  I expect this variable to be negatively 
related to fertility.    
Given that divorce is such a recent phenomenon in the country, it deserves more 
clarification.  I will provide a short synopsis of the cultural role of marriage and confront 
the recent intrusion of divorce in present-day Chinese society. 
 Historically, divorce has been widely condemned in the Chinese culture, and 
much of this has to do with the purpose marriage serves in this society.  Rather than 
being a personal affair of the husband and wife, marriage is an impersonal affair of the 
families of the husband and wife.  “It was stated in the section on marriage definition in 
the Book of Rites, one of the five Chinese classics on Confucian ethical codes, that 
marriage connects the two sexes for serving upwards the ancestral shrine and continuing 
downward the descent of the family line” (Zeng et al. 2002: 409).  Given this familial 
purpose, traditional Chinese marriages are arranged by the couple’s parents, and are 
rarely based on love.   
Up until the late 1980s, divorce was not only discouraged by the people, it was 
opposed by the government (Zeng et al. 2002).  Chinese citizens are monitored closely 
by authorities and the same system which regulates fertility also regulates divorce.  A 
couple just over a decade ago faced many obstacles on the road to divorce.  It was a 
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multi-step process, which began by submitting a request to their work unit head.  The 
work unit head would then likely disagree and attempt to get them to reconcile.  If one or 
both were adamant, their request was occasionally deferred to the civil affairs 
department, which would also try to bring about a reconciliation.  At this point, family 
meetings were often called, wherein the couple was once more encouraged to 
compromise.  If the request was deemed rational, the civil affairs department had the 
option of awarding the divorce.  If not, the case would be sent to a local court.  The court 
would follow a similar procedure in trying to dissuade them from getting a divorce.  
Now at the top of the chain of command, the request would either be granted or turn 
downed by the court.  Countless divorce-seeking individuals gave up at some point in 
this process, or, after loosing in court, were unwilling to go through the process again. 
Socioeconomic development has served to dilute the Confucian ideology over 
the last twenty years in China.  As the society has become more tolerant of divorce, so 
have the authorities (Zeng et al. 2002).  The divorce rate rose from 2.01 per 1000 
married couples in 1982 to 3.13 in 1995.   
Many socioeconomic variables that have contributed to lower fertility in China 
have also contributed to higher divorce rates.  For instance, the Zeng et al. study (2002) 
which evaluated the relationship between different socio-demographic indicators and 
divorce, found urbanization to be positively related to divorce.  In this new atmosphere 
of acceptance, the traditional tenets which once bound couples together sometimes break 
them apart.  “Arranged marriage has a risk of divorce that is about 2.6 times as high as 
that of non-arranged ones” (Zeng et al. 2002: 422).  And “the risk of divorce of women 
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who have three or more daughters without a son was more than twice as high as that of 
those women who have three or more children with at least one son” (Zeng et al. 2002: 
422). 
While divorce is still relatively uncommon throughout China today, I believe it is 
an important variable to include in this thesis particularly since it has not been included 
in previous analyses of Chinese fertility.  Moreover, since I am trying to capture the 
influence of modernization on fertility, it is theoretically consistent to include divorce as 
one of my independent variables.  The variable will be measured as the percentage of the 
total population aged 15 and over that is divorced.  There are more precise measures of 
divorce, such as the general divorce rate, which is the number of divorces that took place 
in year z divided by the mid-year total number of married couples.  Another reliable 
divorce statistic is the divorce rate per woman, i.e., the number of divorces for every 
1000 married women over 15 years of age.  Regretfully my data only permit me to 
develop this more limited measure of divorce.  But since I am really only concerned with 
the variation among the counties in divorce and since I suspect that the variation in my 
measure of divorce and the variation in the other divorce rates will be nearly the same, I 
am comfortable using it in my models.  Percentage divorced is expected to have a 
negative relationship with fertility. 
 The tenth and final variable is percentage of the total population that is in one of 
China’s 55 minority nationalities.  Cultural differences and departures in policy 
enforcement give rise to higher fertility among minority groups.  Therefore, the 
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percentage of minority population is likely to be a key variable in this study, and will be 
included in many of the models. 
Methods 
 In this thesis, I will estimate a series of Ordinary Least Squares multiple 
regression models.  But there are many preliminary steps I will take beforehand. 
 First, I will attend to the normality assumption by evaluating the distributions of 
my dependent and independent variables.  While all of the variables do not have to be 
normally distributed, seriously skewed Y and/or X distributions can produce error 
distributions which violate the normality assumption.  The skewness value in a normal 
distribution is 0.  If skewness surpasses 0.8 in absolute value, then I will know the 
distribution of the variable is likely skewed.  I will also appraise skewness by comparing 
the values of the mean and median, which are the same in a normal distribution.  If the 
mean of the variable has a lower value than the median, then the distribution is skewed 
left.  If the mean has a higher value, it is skewed right.   
I expect that some of my variables will be greatly skewed and this may become a 
serious impediment to my analysis.  Therefore, these problematic variables will be 
modified using power transformation, a group of straightforward transformations:  Yq  or 
q > 0; log Y or q = 0; -(Yq) or q < 0.  As Hamilton (1992: 18) so clearly notes, different 
values of q modify the shape of the distribution, such that “powers greater than 1 (q > 1) 
shift the weight to the upper tail of the distribution and thereby reduce negative skew and 
powers less than 1 (q < 1) pull in the upper tail and may therefore reduce positive skew.”  
As a time saver, rather than exhausting the ladder of powers, people routinely use 
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logarithms when their variables are positively skewed.  Under the guidance of my 
committee chair, Dr. Dudley Poston, I will actually consider several types of 
transformations and choose the one that best suits each variable.   
In STATA, the command ladder will employ the most appropriate 
transformation to convert the variable into a normally distributed variable.  The ladder 
command presents the results of the STATA test known as sktest for each 
transformation, which conducts three tests of normality.  This includes one test based on 
skewness and one based on kurtosis, then a joint chi2 test that is based on both (Poston 
2004).  In this situation we hope to accept the null hypothesis of normality, and 
typically, sktest would permit our doing this.  There are too many observations in my 
data-set, however, for this command to work properly because chi2’s cannot be 
estimated.  The 2,873 counties will result in an enormous chi2 for any of the 
transformations, forcing us to reject rather than accept the null hypothesis of normality.  
Therefore I will employ the command gladder, which considers the same 
transformations as ladder, but displays the results graphically.  This will enable us to 
select the best transformation for each of my variables.  Certainly, sktest is preferred 
over visual inspection, but with such a large number of observations, this is the approach 
I must take.   
 Many of the independent variables in my analysis are collinear, such as the 
percentage urban and the percentage nonagricultural.  People who are living in urban 
areas tend to be employed in occupations outside of agriculture.  If multicollinearity 
becomes too excessive, my parameter estimates will be inaccurate.  Thus, several 
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measures will be taken to address this impending problem.  First, I will examine the 
zero-order correlations for each pair of the ten variables.  I will look at the strength of 
the correlations.  Any correlations above 0.5 or 0.6 indicate possible collinearity 
problems.  Since zero-order correlations have a tendency to obscure certain 
problematical issues, I will next examine scatterplots of each bivariate relationship.  In 
my examination, I will be looking for heteroscedasticity, curvlinearity, and collinearity 
troubles.  I may then unite predictors that are collinear with each other into indexes, 
providing that it makes theoretical sense to do so. 
Third, I will utilize diagnostic methods, examining tolerance values of the 
questionable X variables, to determine if multicollinearity is too extreme.  In STATA, a 
good way of doing this is to “quietly” estimate the regression equation, and then use the 
“vif” command.  I will be concerned if the tolerance value for any of my X variables is 
under 0.35 (i.e. 1/tolerance = VIF), and regression equations with these types of 
problems will not be estimated.  On account of collinearity issues, I plan to split my 
analysis up into several different models.  Each model will be composed of independent 
variables that have correlations under 0.5 or 0.6.  This conservative approach will 
probably result in models containing no more than three or four independent variables.  
Consequently, I expect this may require me to estimate several different regression 
equations.   
After estimating my OLS models, I will employ DFBETAs to determine which 
counties have an overly exceptional impact on the regression coefficients.  Lastly, 
because I expect there may be outlier influence, I will test the validity of my OLS results 
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using Robust Regression.  If OLS and robust methods yield consistent estimates of the 
coefficients, then I will be more assured of my OLS results.  If there are any large 
discrepancies, I will gravitate towards the robust regression results. 
 In examining my coefficients, I expect to find that counties with a lower 
percentage of minority population, a higher percentage of non-agriculture population, a 
higher percentage of urbanization, a higher percentage of white collar workers, a higher 
percentage of one-generation family households, a higher percentage of divorce, lower 
percentages of illiteracy, and less gender difference in regards to illiteracy, will have 
lower total fertility rates. 
After performing my county-level fertility analysis, I will create dummy 
variables for each of the six regions of China.  I will go through the same process again, 
except that I will be examining whether region has a significant impact on fertility.  If 
so, I may then undertake a few region-specific analyses of fertility.   
In the next chapter I provide a detailed description of the dependent and 
independent variables.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
 Chapter IV provides a statistical description of the dependent variable and ten 
independent variables to be used in my OLS models.  I explore the locations of the 
extreme values on each variable, looking to cultural, political, and environmental factors 
for insights.  Lastly, I address the specific power transformations performed on each 
variable, as well as the ensuing means and outermost values.  The chapter will therefore 
be organized around three sections: Dependent Variable, Independent Variables, and 
Transformed Variables.  
According to the 2000 Population Census of China, there are 2,873 Chinese 
counties or county equivalents.  Three of these areas had fertility rates of 0 and were 
consequently dropped from the dataset.  As a result, I will be studying the fertility of the 
remaining 2,870 Chinese counties or county equivalents.  County equivalents are usually 
cities or districts of cities which the fit the administrative criterion of a county.  So bear 
in mind that in referencing counties, I am also referencing county equivalents.  (For sake 
of simplicity, I will not restate this later in the chapter in my interpretation of each 
independent variable.)   
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the total fertility rate (TFR); the TFR is the total 
number of live births an artificial cohort of 1,000 women would end up having if, as they 
survived through their 35 years of childbearing, they were exposed to the ASFRs of a 
county in China in 2000.  As indicated by the census data, China’s TFR is 1.22.  The 
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TFR among the provinces of China ranges from a low of .67 in Beijing to a high of 2.19 
in Guizhou.  The mean value of the TFR among the 2,870 counties of China is 1.32 (SD 
.47).  There is considerable variability among the counties in the TFR about its mean 
value of 1.32, varying from 0.41 in the Xiangyang district of Jiamusi city (Heilongjiang), 
0.43 in the Heping district of Tianjin city (Tianjin), and 0.46 in the Mawei district of 
Fuzhou city (Fujian) to 3.96 in Geji County (Tibet), 4.07 in Jiali County (Tibet), and 
5.47 in Baqing County (Tibet) (see TABLE 1).  The two extreme scores (i.e. 0.41 and 
5.47) produce a range of 5.06.  Clearly, the variation of the TFR at the county level is 
much more dramatic than the variation at the provincial level.   
 The districts with the three lowest TFRs are found in the provinces of 
Heilongjiang, Tianjin, and Fujian, respectively located in the northeast, north, and east 
regions of China.  The per capita GDPs of these three provinces are higher than in most 
provinces of China because they have relatively strong economies and are more 
advanced in the way of development.  Jiamusi City, situated in the heart of Heilonjiang 
Province, contains the district with the lowest TFR in the nation (Liu 2004).  This small 
city is home to the John Deer Company and is known for its healthy environment and 
clean air.  Jiamusi City is also at the forefront of education, recently launching the 
Dongze Joy Foreign Language School, which teaches English to 4 - 15 year olds.   
The four counties with the highest TFRs are located in the Tibet (Xizang) 
Autonomous Region, a poor, rural region in northwest China.  Baqing County, Tibet, has 
the highest TFR in the nation.  In contrast to Jiamusi City, Baqing County has the 
highest illiteracy rate and the highest minority percentage among the 2,870 counties of 
 53
 
China.  These findings seem to fit the expectations of demographic transition theory 
(DTT).  I will now attend to my independent variables, and in doing so, will provide 
more contextual information regarding regions, provinces, and counties. 
Independent Variables 
 Three independent variables represent certain aspects of economic development 
among the counties of China.  One is the percentage of the total population that is 
employed in non-agricultural related work, which has a mean value among the 2,870 
counties of China of 27.84 (SD 25.25) (see TABLE 1).  This means that 27.84 percent of 
the population is employed outside the agricultural realm.  The variability of percentage 
non-agriculture is indicated by its wide range (96.84), from lows of 2.07 percent in 
Jiangda County (Tibet), 2.25 percent in Nanmulin County (Tibet), 2.26 percent in the 
Hongsibao district of Wuzhong city (Ningxia), and 2.36 percent in Shuicheng County 
(Guizhou) to highs of 97.76 percent in the Qianjing district of Jiamusi city 
(Heilongjiang), 97.8 percent in the Lishan district of Anshan city (Liaoning), 97.93 
percent in the Shangganling district of Yichun city (Heilongjiang), and 98.91% in the 
Tiedong district of Anshan city (Liaoning).  The two lowest counties are located in the 
Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region, a sprawling, mountainous region (1,201,000 sq km) 
in southwestern China with a rather small population (2.62 million).  Tibet’s per capita 
GDP is low at 3,716 renminbi and its economy is based almost entirely on subsistence 
agriculture (CPIRC n.d.; CEInet n.d.).  The currency conversion is 1.00 United States 
dollar for every 8.27650 China renminbi.  This indicates that, on average, a person living 
in Tibet makes only $448.97 annually.   
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The two highest scoring districts on the percentage non-agriculture variable are 
located in Liaoning Province of northeastern China.  Liaoning is spatially smaller 
(144,900 km) with a population almost sixteen times the size of Tibet’s (41.40 million) 
and a per capita GDP of 9,333 RMB (CEInet n.d.; CPIRC n.d.).  Liaoning is one of the 
country’s chief industrial bases and holds four ports, one being the main port of 
northeastern China (Beauty 1998; Noll 1997).  Opportunities for non-agricultural 
employment are scarce in Tibet and abundant in Liaoning, so these extreme values on 
this variable seem sensible.  Tibet, which contains the two counties with the smallest 
percentages of non-agricultural workers, also contains the four counties with the highest 
TFRs.  This is indirect support of my hypothesis that percentage non-agriculture will be 
negatively related to fertility. 
  The second economic indicator is the percentage of the total population that is 
urban, which has a mean value of 28.66 (SD 20.96).  This means that, among the 
counties of China, 28.66 percent of the population is residing in an urban area.  The 
variability of percentage urban is extensive, ranging from a minimum of 0.56 percent in 
Linxia County (Gansu) to a maximum of 100 percent in the Meijiang district of Meizhou 
city (Guangdong), and in the Dongshi, Zhongshi, and Xishi districts of Bengbu city 
(Anhui).  These extremes result in a range of 99.44.  The county with virtually no urban 
residents is Linxia, located in Gansu Province of northwest China.  Like Tibet, Gansu is 
a large remote province (454,000 sq km) with a rough patchy terrain of grassland, 
mountains, deserts, and rivers, and given its size, contains a relatively small population 
(25.62 million) (ChinaTravel n.d.; CEInet n.d.).  Linxia County is occupied primarily by 
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the Hui minority nationality, and its environment is quite harsh with cold temperatures 
and land essentially unreceptive to agricultural production (ChinaPlanner n.d.).  Three of 
the four districts that are exclusively urban are found in Bengbu city in Anhui Province 
of eastern China.  Though also a poor province, Anhui has a population twice the size of 
Gansu (59.86 million) and is smaller in size (139,400 sq km) (CEInet n.d.).  Bengdu city 
is a port and an influential industrial base, specializing in machinery production 
(GreatestCities n.d.).  Seeing the contextual differences between Linxia County and 
Bengdu city, their divergent values on the percentage urban variable seem to be 
appropriate. 
 The last economic variable is the percentage of the total employed population 
that is employed in white-collar work.  The mean value for percentage white-collar is 
low at 8.59 (SD 6.49).  Thus, managers, administrators, professionals, and associate 
professionals make up only 8.59 percent of the employed population among the counties 
of China.  The range value for percentage white-collar is 37.25, with a low of 1.37 
percent in Dongxiangzu Zizhi County (Gansu) and a high of 38.62 percent in the 
Xiangyang district of Jiamusi city (Heilongjiang).  Jiamusi city holds one of the highest 
scoring districts in percentage non-agricultural workers, so it is not surprising that it also 
possesses the district with the largest percentage of white-collar workers.  Moreover, 
Heilongjiang Province, located on the northeastern tip of China has a more advanced 
economy and a higher per capita GDP (7,544 RMB) than Gansu Province (3,456 RMB) 
(CEInet n.d.; CPIRC n.d.).  The Xiangyang district of Jiamusi city also displays the 
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lowest TFR among the counties of China, which lends support to my theoretical 
expectations. 
 Two independent variables reflect the presence of traditional family norms and 
cultural values.  These are the percentage divorced and the percentage one generation 
family households.  The mean value for the percentage one generation variable is 20.93 
(SD 7.05), which denotes that 20.93 percent of the households among the 2870 counties 
of China are one generation family households.  The range of percentage one generation 
is considerable, fluctuating from a low of 3.75 percent in Dongxiangzu Zizhi County 
(Gansu) to a high of 58.87 percent in the Baoan district of Shenzhen city (Guangdong).  
In comparison to Gansu’s population size of 25.62 million, Guangdong is significantly 
larger at 86.42 million (CPIRC n.d.).  As mentioned earlier, Gansu is an expansive rural 
province with an erratic landscape, and has one of the lowest per capita GDPs among the 
provinces of China (3,456 RMB).  Located on the southern tip of China, Guangdong is a 
coastal province with more development and a respectable economy (per capita GDP 
11,143).  In fact, Guangdong is prosperous enough that it attracts many migrants from 
other provinces (Wikipedia n.d.).  I anticipated that urban areas would have a greater 
percentage of one generation households, given that urban areas are usually less 
traditional than rural areas.  These divergent findings between Gansu and Guangdong are 
consistent with my expectations.   
The variable percentage divorced has an extremely low mean value of 1.09 (SD 
0.79), which is not surprising given the stigma that is attached to divorce in China.  This 
indicates that on average, only 1.09 percent of the population aged 15 and over is 
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divorced among the counties of China.  Recall that I could not calculate a divorce rate 
because the data does not provide information on the number of divorces taking place in 
2000.  A divorce rate is a more appropriate measurement of this event and yields a 
different type of figure altogether.  However, this more restricted measurement should 
be adequate for evaluating the variation in divorce among the 2,870 counties. 
The range for percentage divorced is 8.07, varying from a low of 0.16 percent in 
the Hongsibao district of Wuzhong city (Ningxia) to a high of 8.23 percent in Leiwuqi 
County (Tibet).  Wuzhong city possesses the district with the lowest percentage divorced 
in all of China and is one of the few major cities in the Ningxia Autonomous Hui 
Region.  Located in northwestern China, Ningxia is small in size (66,000 sq km) and 
population (5.62 million) (CEInet n.d.; Chinastage 1998).  Ningxia was integrated into 
Gansu in 1954, but was disconnected and reestablished as the home of the Muslim Hui 
minority people in 1958 although they comprise only about 30 percent of the region’s 
population.  Ningxia lags behind in development, largely because of a weak 
infrastructure (Italtrade n.d.).  Gravity-fed irrigation from the Yellow River saves this 
area economically, promoting agricultural activities such as grain production.  Even 
though Ningxia is monetarily poor, it is rich in culture and tradition.  In view of the fact 
that divorce is usually associated with modernization, it seems reasonable that Ningxia 
has one virtually divorce-free district.  What is puzzling, however, are the locations of 
those counties with high percentages divorced.   
Leiwuqi County of the Tibet Autonomous Region has the greatest percentage at 
8.23 percent—low by American standards, but considerably high by Chinese.  Leiwuqi 
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County cannot be explained away as an outlier because it does not stand alone; in fact, it 
is accompanied by many other high scoring Tibetan counties.  Tibet has the largest mean 
on the percentage divorced variable among all the provinces and province equivalences 
of China.  Tibet is thick in custom and culture and the Tibetan minority nationality make 
up almost 92 percent of its population (Information Office 2004).  Tibet was “liberated” 
by the P.R.C. in 1951 (see “17-Article Agreement”), and it is still spiritually, 
linguistically, and culturally different from the rest of China.  Data aside, it is doubtful 
that Frank Notestein, the founder of demographic transition theory, would have pegged 
this underdeveloped rural region as the nation’s leader in divorce.  On the other hand, it 
is likely that he would have correctly pinpointed Tibet and Leiwuqi County as high 
fertility areas.  The mean TFR for Tibet is 2.11 and for Leiwuqi County is 3.4; these are 
scores much higher than the overall mean among all the counties of 1.32.   
The other counties with lofty percentages of divorced are Hetian (7.12%), Luopu 
(6.97%), and Shaya (6.22%), all of which belong to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region.  Xinjiang trails Tibet among the thirty one provinces and equivalents with the 
second largest mean on the percentage divorced variable at 2.42%.  Xinjiang, situated in 
northwest China, is a rural region composed of mountains and deserts, and is relatively 
stagnant in terms of modernization and economic development.  In a situation similar to 
Tibet, Xinjiang is largely inhabited by the Uyghur minority nationality which is known 
as a “proud, happy, and independent people” (Verber n.d.: 1).  Xinjiang’s mean TFR is 
1.52, and its high divorce counties have mean TFRs of 2.49, 1.95, and 2.06, appreciably 
higher than the national county mean of 1.32. 
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These descriptive findings are contradictory in that they support and at the same 
time, challenge my hypothesis that percentage divorced will be negatively related to 
fertility.  Are these extreme values simply statistical “noise”?  This may be the case if 
the high divorce counties have a small number of people aged 15 and over because it 
would result in a small denominator, which could produce deceptively high percentages 
of divorced.  
If it is not “noise,” what is causing these unusually high values on this variable?  
Could it be that modernization is unrelated to divorce in China?  Or are certain Chinese 
minority groups more prone to divorce than the Han majority nationality?  These 
questions are beyond the boundaries of this thesis; nevertheless, I am eager to see how 
the variable performs in my OLS models predicting fertility.      
 The next three independent variables are illiteracy percentages, which I will 
employ to explore the effects of basic educational standing on fertility.  The mean value 
for overall illiteracy is 11.49 (SD 11.19).  This indicates that 11.49 percent of the total 
(male and female) population is illiterate among the 2,870 counties of China.  The 
variable ranges from a low of 0.55 percent in Beiliu city (Guangxi) to a high of 86.22 
percent in Baqing County (Tibet).  It is not surprising that the high illiteracy county is 
located in Tibet given the rural and impoverished conditions of this region.  Conversely, 
the minimum extreme is strange and deserves a little more explanation.  Beiliu city has 
almost no illiteracy and it is located in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, which 
borders Guangdong on the south-central tip of China.  Guangxi is a mountainous, rural 
region with a weak infrastructure and a poor economy (Noll 1997; CPIRC n.d.).  The 
 60
 
region’s population numbers 44.89 million and the per capita GDP is low at 4,076 RMB.  
According to demographic transition theory, Guangxi should contain a county with one 
of the highest scores on percentage illiterate, not a county with the lowest.  I believe the 
answer to this enigma lies in the size of Beiliu city.  Although Beiliu city consists of 23 
towns, its entire population is a miniscule 1,186 thousand people (Shuimin 2001).  So in 
all likelihood, its small percentage on the illiteracy variable is just statistical “noise”.   
 As anticipated, a greater percentage of females are illiterate than males.  The 
mean value for male illiteracy is 6.76 (SD 8.55), fluctuating from a low of 0.24 percent 
in Beiliu city (Guangxi) to a high of 78.16 percent in Baqing County (Tibet).  The mean 
value of percentage female illiteracy is 16.47 (SD 14.27), which is more than twice the 
mean value of male illiteracy.  The range value for female illiteracy is sizeable at 93.44, 
with a minimum of 0.89 percent in Beiliu city (Guangxi) and a maximum of 94.33 
percent in Baqing County (Tibet).  The extreme values of male, female, and combined 
illiteracy occur in the same locations and are explained in the preceding paragraph.  
While it is bewildering that the lowest score on percentage illiteracy occurs in Beiliu 
city, Guanxi, the locations of the other low scores on this variable seem sensible.  These 
lows occur in cities and counties of Shanxi, Heilongjiang, and Guangdong.  
In China, it is traditionally the case that sons are provided with more educational 
opportunities than daughters.  Daughters are often times expected to forego prospects for 
personal achievement, since a greater value is bestowed upon sons.  Rather than working 
toward their own aspirations, many daughters often seek employment in the city to help 
pay for their brothers’ education.  Given that educational inequality promotes social 
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inequality, I felt that it was important to measure this phenomenon and explore its 
relationship with Chinese fertility.  The percentage female illiteracy divided by the 
percentage male illiteracy yields a ratio which serves a measurement of female status.  
This independent variable is interpreted as follows:  a value of 1.0 indicates that there is 
an equal amount of male and female illiteracy, a value of greater than 1.0 indicates that 
there is more female illiteracy, and a value of less than 1.0 indicates that there is more 
male illiteracy.  It can be inferred that locations with a value approaching 1.0 have a 
greater degree of equality among the sexes, since both are receiving a similar amount of 
rudimentary education.  
 The mean value of female status is 3.16 (SD 1.41), varying from a low of 0.94 in 
Kangbao County (Hebei) to a high of 16.49 in Pingyuan County (Guangdong).  Kangbao 
County, found in the northern province of Hebei, has the lowest female status score, 
suggesting that there is a substantial amount of egalitarianism between men and women 
in this area.  In fact, its value on this variable shows that there is more illiteracy among 
males than females.  Hebei has a population of 67.44 million and is in close proximity to 
two of China’s major metropolitan areas—Beijing and Tianjin (CPIRC n.d.; Invest-
inchina 2002).  This geographical position has benefited Hebei in many ways.  
Interaction with these neigboring cities has enhanced Hebei’s infrastructure and overall 
development, making it one of the best performers in the government’s economic reform 
effort.  Thus, it seems fitting for Hebei to have a high degree of educational equality 
among the sexes.   
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The maximum score on the female status variable occurred in Pingyan County, 
Guangdong.  Guangdong is a largely urban and economically advanced province, so it is 
rather unexpected for it to contain the county with the greatest degree of inequality.  
Guangdong’s overall illiteracy level is much lower than the national county average at 
6.63 percent (national county average = 11.69%), so perhaps when both sexes are widely 
educated, you see more gender difference than you do in places where educational 
opportunities are scarce.  In rural areas, where educational opportunties are limited, there 
may be less educational inequality because neither sex has sufficient access.  I must 
emphasize that this is all purely speculative.   
 The last independent variable is percentage minority, which will be very 
important to my study since minorities tend to have higher fertility rates than the Han 
majority nationality.  There is substantial variability in percentage minority about its 
mean of 16.14 (SD 28.97), varying from 0 percent in Lin, Shilou, Qingjian, and Zizhou 
Counties of Shaanxi to 99.78 percent in Angren County of Tibet.  This yields a gigantic 
range of 99.78.  Minorities make up over 99.5 percent of the population in ten counties 
of China and all of these high counties are located in Tibet.  This was to be expected, 
since the Tibetan minority nationality is the overwhelming majority group in Tibet.  
Minorities comprise less than 0.02 percent of the population in fifty two counties (or 
county equivalents) of the country.  These extremely low minority locations are found in 
the provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, 
and Shaanxi.    
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Transformed Variables 
 As expected, most of the variables were severely skewed and in need of 
transformation.  For each variable, I produced graphical representations of eight different 
power transformations (i.e. cubic, square, square root, log, 1/square root, inverse, 
1/square, and 1/cubic).  Power transformations are “a way to pull in outliers and make 
skewed distributions more symmetrical, perhaps more normal, and hence easier to 
analyze” (Hamilton 1992: 148).  My thesis chair, Dr. Dudley Poston, assisted me in this 
process and after we viewed the various transformations, the transformations most 
closely approximating normal distributions were chosen.  I did not use statistical tests for 
normality because my number of observations was so large, 2,870.  Formal statistical 
tests almost always tended to reject the null hypothesis of normality.  We relied therefore 
on simple visual inspection of the histograms.  The dependent variable and nine 
independent variables were transformed.  One independent variable, the percentage of 
one generation family households, did not necessitate transformation because its 
skewness value was less than 0.8 at 0.77.   
 I transformed most of the variables, specifically the TFR, percentage non-
agriculture, percentage white-collar, percentage divorced, percentage illiteracy, 
percentage male illiteracy, percentage female illiteracy, female status, and percentage 
minority using base 10 logarithms.  It makes no difference if one uses natural logarithms 
or base 10 logarithms.  The base 10 logarithm of a variable is the power to which 10 
must be raised to yield the value of the variable, whereas the natural logarithm is the 
power to which “e” must be raised to yield the value of the variable.  In some 
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demographic research in which variables are transformed, the natural logarithm is often 
used instead of the base 10 logarithm.  It actually makes no difference with regard to the 
transformation.  Both logarithms have identical effects on the shape of the transformed 
variable (Hamilton 1992: 17).  I will now provide a brief statistical overview of these 
transformed variables. 
The skewness of the dependent variable or TFR, dropped from 1.52 to 0.16 after 
I transformed it by taking the base 10 log of the TFR.  The TFR was positively skewed 
and the log transformation drew in high values on this variable, making its distribution 
more normal.  The mean of the log of TFR is 0.29 (SD 0.33), ranging from a minimum 
of -0.89 to a maximum of 1.70. 
   In its raw form the independent variable, percentage non-agriculture, had a 
skew of 1.36.  The log transformation reduced high outliers, yielding a new skew of 
0.31.  The mean of the log of percentage non-agriculture is 2.97 percent (SD .84), 
varying from a low of 0.73 percent to a high of 4.59 percent. 
 For the independent variable, percentage urban, the square root transformation (q 
= .5) worked best.  While square roots is less powerful than the log transformation, it 
also brings in extreme outliers.  The skewness of percentage urban fell from 1.36 to 0.67 
after making this conversion.  The mean of the square root of percentage urban is 5.03 
percent (SD 1.82), ranging from 0.75 percent to 10.0 percent. 
 The high skew of percentage white-collar was considerably reduced by using the 
log transformation, declining from 1.82 to 0.63.  The mean of the log of percentage 
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white-collar is 1.94 percent (SD 0.62), with a minimum value of 0.32 percent and a 
maximum value of 3.65 percent. 
Percentage divorced was one of the most abnormally distributed independent 
variables, possessing a positive skew of 2.58.  Once again, of the eight different power 
transformations, the base 10 logarithm was the best choice, lowering its skew to 0.55.  
The mean of the log of percentage divorced is -0.11 percent (SD 0.58), fluctuating from 
-1.83 percent to 2.11 percent. 
 All three of the illiteracy variables had very poor distributions with severe 
positive skew and for each of them the base 10 logarithm produced the most normal 
distribution.  The mean of the log of percentage illiteracy is 2.17 percent (SD 0.68), with 
extreme values of -0.60 percent and 4.46 percent.  The mean of the log of percentage 
male illiteracy is 1.50 percent (SD 0.86), with outermost values of -1.43 percent and 4.36 
percent.  The mean of the log of percentage female illiteracy is 2.57 percent (SD 0.64), 
with furthermost values of -0.12 percent and 4.55 percent. 
 The independent variable, female status, had a positive skew of 2.16 and an 
extremely abnormal distribution.  After evaluating the graphical representations of the 
eight different transformations, we again chose to use the base 10 logarithm in 
generating our new variable.  The mean of the log of female status is 1.07 (SD 0.39), 
varying from a low of -0.06 to a high of 2.80.  Skewness dropped to 0.37 after making 
this adjustment. 
 While most of the independent variables responded well to several of the 
transformations, the distribution of the percentage minority variable was only improved 
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by the base 10 logarithm.  This made our task easier because the choice was an obvious 
one.  The mean of the log of percentage minority is 0.61 percent (SD 2.38), with 
outermost values of -4.61 percent and 4.60 percent.  In making this distribution more 
symmetric, the skew of percentage minority fell from 1.83 to 0.15. 
 China has finally become a lowest-low fertility population; however, fertility 
differs markedly among the nation’s regions, provinces and counties.  This statistical 
description has illustrated how drastic variation amid social and economic factors may 
contribute to these fertility fluctuations.  The following chapter presents the results and 
interpretations of my OLS regression models.  Two duplicate analyses will be discussed: 
one that does not include region and one that does.     
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CHAPTER V 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE  
 
In this chapter, several Ordinary Least Squares regression equations are 
estimated to test the strength and capacity of demographic transition theory (DTT) in 
predicting Chinese fertility.  First, I discuss at length the diagnostic strategies that helped 
in preventing statistical problems and developing models later in the study.  Next, I 
present the results of three multiple regression models across the 2,432 counties of 
China.  The number of counties has fallen from 2,870 to 2,432.  This is because 438 
counties had missing data on one or more of the independent variables.  So to maintain 
consistency, I dropped all 438 and used the same number of counties in all equations for 
the duration of the analysis.  Finally, I present the results of the same three models, while 
controlling for the effects of region.    
Diagnostic Strategies 
To ensure that my OLS models were statistically sound, I used several 
diagnostics prior to the analysis.  Initially, I assessed the distributions of the dependent 
and independent variables, and I found all but one of the variables to be skewed (i.e. 
skewness was greater than 0.8 in absolute value).  Heavily skewed Y and/or X 
distributions can produce nonnormal error terms, which thus violate the normality 
assumption.  Consequently I decided to conduct power transformations on these 
variables to draw in the positive outliers; most were transformed using the base 10 
logarithm.  Please note that when referring to variables over the course of this chapter, I 
 68
 
will refer to their transformed versions.  The only variable that did not require 
transformation is percentage households with one generation. 
 Next, I examined the zero-order correlations of the independent variables with 
the TFR and with each other (see TABLE 2).  All of the independent variables were 
associated with the TFR in the direction my hypotheses predicted, except for female 
status (r = -0.115).  This is not overly shocking, since the outermost values on that 
variable had already alerted me to potential problems.  The high county on that variable 
is located in the relatively modernized province of Guangdong, which would go against 
theoretical expectations.  As reported in TABLE 2, the three urbanization and economic 
variables have moderate to moderately high correlations with fertility: percentage labor 
force white collar, -0.455; percentage population urban, -0.560; and percentage 
population nonagriculture, -0.568.  Both of the variables reflect traditional family norms 
and cultural values and show the hypothesized negative association with fertility: 
percentage households one generation, -0.422 and percentage 15+ divorced, -0.087.  
After discovering the strange locations of the high percentage divorced counties, I was 
concerned that divorce may have a positive rather than a negative relationship with 
Chinese fertility.  Even though the relationship between fertility and divorce is extremely 
weak, as illustrated by the correlation of -0.087, I was relieved to see that it was negative 
as I had initially imagined it would be.  The three variables which assess illiteracy have 
modest correlations with fertility: percentage illiterate, 0.439; percentage male illiterate, 
0.394; and percentage female illiterate, 0.441.  A little perplexing is the very fairly small 
correlation between percentage minority and fertility of 0.232.  Among the counties of 
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Sichuan Province, this correlation was much stronger at 0.542, and I had expected to see 
an even higher degree of association in this analysis.  Part of the reason for the diluted 
association is that I am using the transformed variables in this thesis, whereas I used the 
raw variables in the previous study. 
 Several of my independent variables were highly correlated with one another, 
which signified collinearity problems.  The following independent variables have 
correlations with each other above 0.5:  percentage urban and percentage households one 
generation, 0.538; percentage male illiterate and female status, -0.665; percentage urban 
and percentage white collar, 0.754; percentage nonagriculture and percentage white 
collar, 0.838; percentage nonagriculture and percentage urban, 0.845; percentage male 
illiterate and percentage female illiterate, 0.878; percentage illiterate and percentage 
male illiterate, 0.941; and percentage illiterate and percentage female illiterate 0.987.  
These high correlations were expected given that most of these variables are clearly 
related to one another (e.g. people who are engaged in nonagricultural employment are 
more likely to have white collar occupations). 
 Scatterplots of these bivariate relationships confirmed my suspicions regarding 
the highly correlated independent variables.  For instance, the graph of percentage 
illiterate with percentage female illiterate showed a tight, positive, straight line pattern 
(indicating that almost all of the variance in one is accounted for by the other).  
Scatterplots illustrating the bivariate relationships of the TFR with each of the ten 
independent variables (see FIGURES 1-10) were especially telling.  Positive and 
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negative associations are easily identified in each of the plots by the directional flow of 
the observations. 
After these preliminary checks, I was ready to split my analysis up into different 
models.  This process was also performed in steps and with particular questions in mind.  
The zero-order correlations had alerted me to the highly associated illiteracy variables.  
All three showed the expected positive relationships with fertility.  But since they could 
not be estimated together in the same OLS models, I discarded two and retained only 
one for my analysis.  My other concern was regarding the female status variable, which 
had a relationship with fertility that ran counter to my hypothesis.  I anticipated that 
female status, measuring educational inequality between the sexes, would be positively 
associated with fertility, but instead the association was negative.  Typically, when 
correlations are negative, effects are negative, but I wanted to be sure before taking 
female status out of my analysis.   
Extensive pairing and exploration with different regression models helped me to 
determine that female illiteracy had a greater impact on fertility than the two other 
illiteracy variables.  Predominantly, the female status variable had negligible impact on 
fertility.  And when the effects were significant, they contradicted the assumptions of 
demographic transition theory.   
Obviously, results are not always consistent with our theoretical expectations and 
when they deviate, it is inappropriate for a researcher to remove the offending variables 
from the analysis altogether.  Along these lines, someone might say that the disruptive 
effect of female status is an important finding and one to be explored throughout the 
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study.  There a few factors, however, that would prevent me from taking this stance 
regarding the female status variable.  First of all, ratios are known to cause problems in 
quantitative studies like this one; numerator and denominator effects often distort 
measurement outcomes.  Accordingly, the strange association of female status with 
fertility could be a methodological issue.  My second source of skepticism is the two 
decades worth of research verifying this negative relationship between female status and 
fertility in China.  This furthers my belief that this is simply a statistical snag, not a 
reflection of reality.  Third, employing illiteracy percentages in my development of the 
female status variable may have been an unsuitable choice of action, given the high 
degree of literacy that exists throughout China today.  Census 2000 provides an 
abundance of data on educational attainment, which may have been used to achieve a 
more accurate measurement of inequality among the sexes.  Perhaps I should have 
measured female status by taking the ratio of the percentage of females completing high 
school to the percentage of males completing high school.  Further research will need to 
consider some of these options.    
For these reasons, before developing my definitive OLS fertility models, I 
dropped percentage illiteracy, percentage male illiteracy, and female status from the pool 
of independent variables.  I now had seven predictors remaining.  
To guard against collinearity problems, I decided each model would only be 
composed of independent variables whose correlations were under 0.60.  I also chose to 
eliminate models that produced tolerance values below 0.40 for any of the variables.  In 
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taking this conservative approach to model building, however, I had no tolerance 
problems, and so elimination was never an issue.   
The three economic development variables, percentage urban, percentage 
nonagriculture, and percentage white collar, were highly associated with one another 
(Pearsonian r’s > .75), so I could not include them together in the same model.  The 
other four variables, percentage one generation, percentage divorced, percentage 
minority, and percentage female illiterate, had inconsequential relationships with one 
another and the economic variables, indicating that they could be simultaneously 
estimated.   
In view of the three highly correlated economic development variables, I decided 
to divide my analysis into three distinct OLS models (see TABLE 3).  Each model 
contains five independent variables and the TFR.  The four cultural, minority, and 
illiteracy independent variables are the same in all three models; the single economic 
variable is what sets the models apart from one another. 
As noted previously, I expect the cultural and economic development variables to 
have negative effects on fertility, while I expect the minority and illiteracy variables to 
have positive effects on fertility.  TABLE 3 reports the effects of these independent 
variables on the TFR for all three multiple regression models.  Standardized estimates 
are listed in parentheses under the coefficients and significance values are specified with 
asterisks (see key beneath TABLE 3).  Recall that I have transformed all but one of my 
variables, which makes the full interpretation of their respective coefficients somewhat 
unconventional and unwieldy.  So in the interpretations of the regression coefficients, I 
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will not state them precisely using the transformations in my interpretations. For 
example, I will not be interpreting my regression coefficients in the following way: For 
every one unit increase in the square-root of percentage urban, there is an average .060 
decrease in the log10 of the TFR, provided that the values on the other independent 
variables remain constant.  Instead, for the sake of brevity, I will not engage in such 
detailed explanations and will address my estimates as simple positive or negative 
associations.  I will be interpreting the above association as follows:  Percentage urban is 
negatively and significantly associated with the TFR, controlling for the other variables 
in the equation.  Also, in many of my interpretations, I will not be adding the phrase 
“controlling for the other variables in the equation.”  Each interpretation, however, 
obviously carries with it the above proviso.  
Models 1-3 
Model 1 examines the impact of five independent variables on the TFR.  The 
economic development variable in this regression analysis is the percentage of the 
population that is urban, and is expected to have a negative relationship with the TFR.  
That is to say, the higher the percentage of urban residents in a county, the lower the 
fertility.  The two variables intended to measure traditional family norms and cultural 
values, the percentage of households that are one generation and the percentage of the 
population (15+) that is divorced, are also both expected to be negatively associated with 
the TFR.  Ethnic differences and more flexible policy requirements should lead to higher 
fertility rates among minority groups; thus, I anticipate the minority variable to have a 
positive relationship with the TFR.  Specifically, I hypothesize that counties with a high 
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percentage of minority population will have high rates of fertility.  The last independent 
variable is the percentage of the female population (15+) that is illiterate, and it is 
expected to be positively associated with the TFR. 
 The coefficients in Model 1 all show significant effects on fertility in the 
hypothesized direction: percentage urban (-), percentage one generation (-), percentage 
divorced (-), percentage minority (+), and percentage female illiterate (+).  Each of the 
five coefficients is significant at p < 0.005.  The R2 (adjusted) statistic is 0.4212, 
meaning that a little over 42 percent of the variance in fertility is accounted for by these 
three X variables.  The F is a high 354.77, p = 0.000, indicating that it is improbable that 
R2 in the population is zero.  In my evaluation of the standardized coefficients, I see that 
percentage urban has the strongest influence over fertility among these five variables, b* 
= -.371, followed by percentage female illiterate, percentage minority, percentage one 
generation, and percentage divorced.  While the effect of percentage divorced on the 
TFR is comparatively weak, I was excited to see that the relationship was significant and 
in the hypothesized negative direction.  This model supports the notions of demographic 
transition theory. 
 Model 2 uses four of the same independent variables, percentage one generation, 
percentage divorced, percentage minority, and percentage female illiterate to predict the 
TFR.  The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is that percentage urban has been 
replaced by percentage nonagriculture, which is also expected to have a negative effect 
on fertility.  Once again, all of the coefficients’ signs are in the expected direction and all 
are significant at p < 0.005, with the exception of the percentage divorced coefficient, 
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which has the hypothesized effect but is not significant at 0.05.  The following are some 
general interpretations of the coefficients in Model 2.  As the percentage of 
nonagricultural workers increases, the TFR decreases, controlling for the other variables 
in the equation.  For every increase in the percentage of one generation households (or 
nuclear family households), there is a corresponding decrease in the TFR.  The greater 
the percentage of minority population, the higher the TFR, all things equal.  And finally, 
with every increase in the percentage of female illiterate, there is a subsequent increase 
in the TFR.    
In Model 2, the percentage of the population employed in nonagricultural work 
has the largest impact on the TFR, b* = -.405, trailed by percentage female illiterate, 
percentage one generation, and percentage minority.  The R2 (adjusted) is slightly larger 
in Model 2 than in Model 1 at 0.4335, indicating that the X variables explain just over 43 
percent of the variation in the TFR among the counties of China.  The null hypothesis 
that all five b coefficients are zero can be rejected, as F = 373.00, p = 0.000.  The two 
economic development variables, percentage urban and percentage nonagriculture, have 
the largest relative effects on fertility in Models 1 and 2, lending further support to 
demographic transition theory.   
 Model 3 presents the results of another multiple regression analysis of the TFR 
on the same four cultural, minority, and illiteracy variables, but this time the economic 
development variable is percentage white collar workers.  This new variable is expected 
to have a negative impact on the TFR.  The coefficients reveal that all of the independent 
variables have significant effects on fertility in the hypothesized direction: percentage 
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white collar (-), percentage one generation (-), percentage divorced (-), percentage 
minority (+), and percentage female illiterate (+).  The coefficient of percentage 
divorced is significant at p < 0.05, and the other four coefficients are significant at p < 
0.005.  Considering the standardized coefficients, percentage female illiterate has the 
strongest effect on fertility, b* = 0.281, followed by percentage white collar, percentage 
one generation, percentage minority, and percentage divorced.  Given that there is such a 
small percentage of white collar workers among the counties of China, it seems sensible 
that the effect of this economic development variable is less than the effects of those in 
the previous two models.  The X variables in Model 3 account for 38 percent of the 
variation in the TFR among the 2,432 counties of China and the Ho may be rejected; F = 
299.83 and p = 0.000. 
 An indication of robustness is that the adjusted coefficients of determination (R2) 
do not vary much among the three different models, ranging from 0.3807 to 0.4335.  I 
examined tolerance values to determine if multicollinearity was too extreme in any of 
the three regression equations.  None of the tolerance values dropped below 0.40 for any 
of the X variables; thus, collinearity is not a problem.  Model 3 has the lowest tolerance 
value of 0.59 on the percentage nonagriculture variable, which means that 59 percent of 
the variance in percentage nonagriculture is unrelated to the other four independent 
variables.  Such high tolerance values were expected, since I only used predictors with 
inter correlations of 0.60 or less. 
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 I re-estimated these three models using robust regression equations and found the 
outcomes to be very comparable to my OLS outcomes.  The size and significance of the 
coefficients remained constant, bolstering my confidence in the OLS results. 
These results support my general hypothesis that, among the 2,432 counties of 
China, the higher the levels of social and economic development, the lower the fertility. 
Models 4-6: Regional Controls 
 As I mentioned previously, I felt that it was important to test demographic 
transition theory while controlling for region, since theoretically, DTT is expected to 
work in any given setting.  Therefore, in this next part of my OLS analysis, I estimate 
the same three models, but add to each of them dummy variables for the six regions of 
China.  Since I had to choose one region for the reference group, I first examined the 
mean TFRs among the counties in each of the regions.  The results are as follows.  The 
North region contains the provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner 
Mongolia and has a mean TFR of 1.31.  The Northeast region consists of Liaoning, Jilin, 
and Heilongjiang and has a mean TFR of 0.95.  The East region includes Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Shandong and has a mean TFR of 1.24.  
The Central South region holds the provinces of Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, and Hainan and has an average TFR of 1.39.  The Southwest region includes 
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan and its mean TFR is 1.71.  And finally, the 
Northwest region contains the provinces of Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, 
and Xingjiang and has a mean TFR of 1.51.  Based on these regional TFRs, I chose the 
Northeast region as my reference group with the lowest overall TFR of 0.95. 
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 Models 4-6 (see TABLE 4) present the results of three multiple regression 
analyses of the TFR on the various socioeconomic and cultural variables, while 
controlling for region.  As stated above, the DTT variables that were used in Models 1-3 
are exactly the same in Models 4-6, the only difference being the introduction in Models 
4-6 of the region dummies.   
 In Model 4, four of the five DTT coefficients are statistically significant at p < 
0.005 and are signed in the expected direction.  All things equal, percentage urban is 
negatively related to the TFR, percentage one generation is negatively associated with 
the TFR, percentage minority is positively related to the TFR, and percentage female 
illiterate is positively tied to the TFR.  The coefficient of percentage divorced is neither 
significant nor shows the predicted effect.  The region coefficients are all positively and 
significantly related to the TFR, but they are included in the model only as controls, not 
substantive predictors.  The coefficients of these region variables are all positive.  This 
means that the fertility rates of the counties in the five regions are all higher than that of 
the reference region, the Northeast, controlling for the effects of the substantive DTT 
variables.  This means that even after considering the DTT variables included in the 
equations, there remain differences in fertility among the regions. 
DTT seems to have fared well even under the regional controls so far, as the 
DTT coefficients in Model 4 are very comparable to those in Model 1.  I will now track 
their changes (please note that when I say increase or decrease, I am referring to the 
absolute value of the coefficient).  Percentage urban decreased from -0.060 in Model 1 
to -0.051 in Model 4; percentage one generation increased from -0.007 to -0.008; 
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percentage minority stayed the same at 0.020; and percentage female illiterate decreased 
from 0.120 in Model 1 to 0.086 in Model 4.  The R2 (adjusted) in Model 4 is moderately 
high at 0.4953, meaning that the variables in this model account for nearly half of the 
variation in the TFR.  This is just a little higher than the R2 (adjusted) in Model 1 of 
0.4212 because differences among the regions are now taken into account. 
 Model 5 is a duplication of Model 2, except that I have incorporated the region 
dummy variables.  Once again, excluding percentage divorced, the coefficients of the 
DTT variables show the hypothesized effect on the TFR and are statistically significant 
at p < 0.005.  Even when controlling for region, percentage nonagriculture and 
percentage one generation are both negatively related to the TFR, while percentage 
minority and percentage female illiterate are both positively associated with the TFR.  
The size of the coefficients in Model 2 and Model 5 are similar.  Percentage 
nonagriculture decreased from -0.175 to -0.139, percentage one generation increased 
from -0.008 to -0.010, percentage minority decreased from 0.021 to 0.020, and 
percentage female illiterate decreased from 0.098 in Model 2 to 0.076 in Model 5.  This 
speaks well for DTT in predicting Chinese fertility.  The R2 (adjusted) is augmented 
slightly from 0.4335 in Model 2 to 0.4942 in Model 5.   
Model 6 is estimating the effects of the same DTT variables on fertility as Model 
3, while controlling for region.  Percentage white collar is negatively and significantly 
associated with the TFR, controlling for the other variables in the equation, including 
region.  Percentage one generation is negatively and significantly related to the TFR.  
Percentage minority is positively and significantly associated with the TFR, everything 
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else equal.  And percentage female illiterate is positively and significantly related to the 
TFR, controlling for percentage white collar, percentage one generation, percentage 
minority, percentage divorce, and region.  All the coefficients are significant at p < 
0.005.  Again, the coefficient of percentage divorced is both insignificant and signed in 
the wrong direction.  The fact that this has occurred in all three models suggests that 
region is related to divorce and when controlling for region, we dilute the effect of 
divorce on the TFR.  I am not too concerned about percentage divorced, however, since 
it is not exactly a bona fide DTT variable as are percentage urban, percentage 
nonagriculture, percentage white collar, and percentage female illiterate.  These 
coefficients barely change from Model 3 to Model 6, which indicates that DTT is 
reasonably successful at predicting Chinese fertility.  The R2 (adjusted) increases from 
0.3807 in Model 3 to 0.4613 in Model 6.  The null hypothesis that all the b coefficients 
are zero can be rejected, as F = 209.17 and p = 0.000. 
 I employed robust regression to test the accuracy of the OLS results for Models 
4-6 and saw very little change in the performance of the DTT predictors.  This reassured 
me of my original OLS findings. 
The fundamental DTT variables in all three models have maintained their 
statistical significance while controlling for region.  In this analysis, I was able to 
examine two new variables, percentage (15+) divorced and percentage one generation 
households.  While percentage divorced became insignificant after controlling for 
region, percentage one generation maintained significance and strength throughout the 
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analysis.  This illustrates that not only do urbanization and modernization decrease 
fertility, so does a break with the traditional family household.  
The effect of percentage divorced on fertility may be weakened to some extent 
by the conflicting origins of divorce in present-day China.  Zeng and his colleagues 
(2002) found that urbanization is positively related to divorce, which is compatible with 
the expectations of demographic transition theory.  However, their research also showed 
that in some instances the risk of divorce is higher among persons with arranged 
marriages and among women who fail to produce a son by the time they have their third 
child.  Thus it appears that divorce is linked to secularization and lower levels of fertility 
in some areas of the country, while it is linked to traditional beliefs and higher levels of 
fertility in other parts of the country.  Since I included all 2,432 counties in this phase of 
my fertility analysis, these contradictory relationships were likely captured in my OLS 
equations and are reflected in the results.  Perhaps when this variable is employed in 
later region-specific analyses, its effect will be stronger.  If in fact this is the case, I can 
assume it is because these types of inconsistencies were overcome by a more 
homogenous group of counties (i.e. mainly secularized or mainly traditional).   
These OLS results suggest that DTT is valid for predicting and understanding 
fertility among the counties of China.  Even with the nation’s legendary family planning 
policy, other factors indeed play a role in the fertility outcomes of the people of China.   
In the next chapter, I will present the results of two region-specific fertility 
analyses. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
REGION-SPECIFIC REGRESSION ANALYSES OF THE TOTAL  
 
FERTILITY RATE 
 
 In the last chapter, it was shown that demographic transition variables are quite 
successful predicting fertility among the 2,432 counties of China (see TABLE 3).  Most 
of these variables maintained consistency in effect and significance, even while 
controlling for region (see TABLE 4).  At the same time, it was apparent that region 
also played a large role in determining the fertility levels among the Chinese counties.  
Each of the region dummy variables had a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the TFR in all three models.  Given these findings, Dr. Poston and I decided that it 
would be wise to conduct two region-specific fertility analyses, one for the highest 
fertility region of China and one for the lowest.  This approach would be a more accurate 
and stringent test of DTT, ultimately bolstering or weakening our confidence in the 
theory’s capacity for predicting Chinese fertility.   
 Chapter VI thus presents the results of six models.  The basic three models 
(shown in TABLE 3) from Chapter V are employed in two region-specific analyses.  
The first fertility analysis focuses on the Northeast Region, which has the lowest mean 
TFR among the six regions of China of 0.95.  The second analysis involves the 
Southwest Region, which has the highest mean TFR of 1.71.  (Note that the means of 
these regions are calculated from the counties within these regions, not from the 
provinces.  In other words, though I am shifting to a regional focus, this is still a county-
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level investigation.)  When I discuss the results of Models 7-12, I will compare them to 
the results of Models 1-3.  
Models 7-9 
Models 7-9 (see TABLE 5) pertain to the counties of the Northeast, the lowest 
fertility region of China.  The Northeast Region contains the three relatively modernized 
provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.  As you, the reader, will soon see, this 
situation alters the predictive impact of the DTT variables in a unique way. 
 Model 7 examines the effects of five independent variables on the TFR among 
the 216 counties of Northeast China.  The predictors are the same as in Model 1.  The 
percentage of the population that is urban, the percentage of households that are one 
generation, and the percentage of the population (15+) that is divorced, are the 
independent variables expected to have negative relationships with the TFR.  In contrast, 
the percentage of the population that is minority, and the percentage of the female 
population (15+) that is illiterate are the independent variables anticipated to have 
positive associations with the TFR. 
 The coefficients in Model 7 show all of the independent variables as having 
significant effects on fertility in the hypothesized directions, except for percentage one 
generation: percentage urban (-), percentage divorced (-), percentage minority (+), and 
percentage female illiterate (+).   
 Model 7 demonstrates that even in the Northeast, as the percentage of urban 
residents in the population increases, the TFR decreases, controlling for the effects of the 
other independent variables.  The significance of this variable has fallen from p < 0.005 
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in Model 1 to p < 0.05 in Model 7.  But this is due in part to a reduction in the number of 
observations.  In contrast to the countrywide county-level analysis where much of the 
population is rural, this analysis was performed on a largely urban population.  Hence, 
the influence of this variable was weakened to some extent. 
 The performance of the two variables intended to expose traditional family 
norms and cultural values, percentage divorced and percentage one generation, differed 
markedly in Model 7.  Unexpectedly, the most notable statistic in the entire model is the 
coefficient of percentage divorced, significant at p < 0.005.  Among the five variables, 
percentage divorced has the largest standardized impact on the TFR, b* = -0.370, 
followed by percentage female illiterate, 0.317, percentage minority, 0.264, and 
percentage urban, -0.226.  In Model 1, percentage divorced was also significant at p < 
0.005, but it exerted the least amount of influence among these same five variables.  
Percentage urban and percentage divorced are perfect illustrations of how geographical 
differences may reduce the effect of a particular variable, while inflating the effect of 
another. 
In Model 1, among all the counties of China, the percentage one generation 
variable did quite well, displaying both a negative and significant effect on the TFR at p 
< 0.005.  Conversely, percentage one generation households had neither the 
hypothesized effect nor a statistically significant impact on the TFR in Model 7.  So 
limiting the analysis to the low fertility region eradicated its influence altogether.  
Conceivably in the predominately urbanized Northeast Region, most households are 
nuclear family households, with only a handful of households being composed of 
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extended families.  If in fact this is the case, there may not have been sufficient variation 
for this variable to function properly in the OLS regression equation.   
As in Model 1, percentage minority and percentage female illiterate are both 
positively and significantly related to the TFR in Model 7 at p < 0.005.  This means that 
with each increase in the percentage of minority population, there will be a 
corresponding increase in the TFR among the 216 counties of Northeast China, all else 
equal.  Additionally, it may be said that with each decrease in the percentage of females 
(15+) that are illiterate, there will be a subsequent decrease in the TFR, holding constant 
the effects of the other independent variables on the TFR. 
 The R2 (adjusted) statistic indicates that the independent variables in Model 7 
explain almost 45% of the variation in the TFR among the counties of the Northeast.  
The null hypothesis that all five predictors are zero is easily rejected, as F = 35.97 and p 
= 0.000. 
 Model 8 estimates the effects of percentage nonagriculture, percentage one 
generation, percentage divorced, percentage minority, and percentage female illiterate on 
the TFR.  The predictors are identical to those in Model 2.   
As occurred in Model 7, the one independent variable in Model 8 that operates 
poorly on the TFR is the percentage of one generation households; it is both insignificant 
and signed in the wrong direction.  The other four variables show significant effects in 
the hypothesized direction.   
 The percentage of the population employed in non-agricultural related work is 
negatively associated with the TFR among the counties of the Northeast and is 
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significant at p < 0.05.  The coefficient of this variable was slightly more significant in 
Model 2 at p < 0.005.  This change is reminiscent of that which occurred with the 
percentage urban variable in Model 7.  It is likely that the effects of both of these 
variables were reduced in part because of the developed living conditions in the 
Northeast.  Much of the population is urbanized and engaged in non-agricultural 
employment, so the measures were not afforded the variability they had in the 
nationwide county-level analysis. 
 In Model 2, the coefficient of percentage divorced was insignificant, but in 
Model 8, it is very significant at p < 0.005.  With each increase in the percentage of the 
population (15+) that is divorced among the counties of the Northeast, there is a 
resulting decrease in the TFR, all else equal.   
 As expected, percentage minority and percentage female illiterate have negative 
relationships with the TFR in Model 8 and their coefficients are both significant at p < 
0.005. 
 In my evaluation of the standardized coefficients, I note that percentage female 
illiterate and percentage divorced have the strongest influence over fertility among these 
five variables, with respective b*’s of 0.330 and -0.330.  These findings are much 
different from those of Model 2, where percentage nonagriculture had considerably more 
relative impact than the other four independent variables.   
 The R2 (adjusted) statistic in Model 8 is 0.4501, meaning that 45% of the 
variance in fertility among the counties of the Northeast is accounted for by these five 
 87
 
independent variables.  The F is 36.20 and p = 0.000, indicating that it is unlikely that R2 
in the population is zero. 
 Model 9 presents the results of the same multiple regression equation shown in 
Model 3, except of course, that it is specific to the counties of the Northeast.  The 
coefficients show only three of the independent variables as having significant effects on 
fertility in the hypothesized directions: percentage minority (+), percentage female 
illiterate (+), and percentage divorced (-).   
As expected, percentage white collar has a negative relationship with the TFR, 
but it is insignificant at all levels.  In Model 3, this variable was significant at p < 0.005 
and as evidenced by the standardized coefficients, it had one of the strongest effects on 
the TFR among the five independent variables.  Among the developed counties of the 
Northeast, it is apparent that fertility outcomes have little to do with the percentage of 
the labor force that is employed in white collar occupations.  Why is this so?  In the 
nationwide county-level fertility analysis, percentage white collar served as a reliable 
measure of economic development and modernization since managers, administrators, 
professionals, and associate professionals are almost always employed in urban areas.  
But when limiting my analysis to the Northeast Region, I am essentially limiting it to 
urbanized areas.  Therefore, the variable loses its function as an indicator of urbanization 
and development.  Recall that only 5.92% of the labor force in China is employed in 
these white collar occupations, so the measure itself is very restricted, barring its purpose 
as an overall indicator of economic development.  It seems plausible that this variable 
was only significant in Model 3 because it is so highly related to other markers of 
 88
 
urbanization, such as percentage nonagriculture and percentage urban.  Both of these 
variables were left out of the regression equation for precisely this reason; all three 
variables (i.e. percentage white collar, percentage nonagriculture, and percentage urban) 
are highly collinear with one another.   
Model 9 also shows percentage one generation to be ineffective; its coefficient is 
both insignificant and signed in the wrong direction.  I have already discussed my 
reasoning behind this variable’s diluted impact on fertility in the Northeast, so I will now 
proceed with a short discussion of the significant independent variables. 
The coefficients of percentage divorced, percentage minority, and percentage 
female illiterate are all significant at p < 0.005.  According to the standardized 
coefficients in Model 9, percentage divorced has the strongest impact on the TFR, b* =    
-0.445, followed by percentage female illiterate, 0.337, and percentage minority, 0.282.  
In Model 3, percentage divorced had the smallest effect on fertility among the five 
predictors and was less significant at p < 0.05.  The influences of percentage female 
illiterate and percentage minority on the TFR are also intensified in Model 9, but the 
differences were less drastic than that of percentage divorced. 
The independent variables in Model 9 account for 44% of the variation in the 
TFR among the 216 counties of the Northeast and the null hypothesis may be rejected; F 
= 34.40 and p = 0.000. 
The R2’s (adjusted) do not differ much among Models 7-9, ranging from 0.4372 
to 0.4501.  This indicates that there is robustness about this combination of variables in 
explaining fertility in the Northeast.  I also inspected tolerance values to determine if 
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multicollinearity was a problem in any of the regression equations and found that none 
of the tolerances dropped below 0.30 for any of the independent variables.  While these 
tolerances are a bit lower than those of Models 1-3, that was to be expected since there 
are 2,216 fewer observations in this analysis.  Furthermore, the counties in the Northeast 
are more homogenous than those spanning the entire nation.  I re-estimated Models 7-9 
using robust regression and almost all of the coefficients are less than one standard error 
from the analogous robust coefficients.  Thus, I am confident about my reporting of the 
OLS results. 
Models 7, 8, and 9 suggest that divorce has the largest impact on Chinese fertility 
in the developed Northeast—a very intriguing discovery!  Liaoning, Jilin, and 
Heilongjiang are all relatively modernized, so the urbanization and economic 
development variables are having a diminished impact on the TFR among the counties in 
those provinces.  The percentage minority and percentage female illiterate variables have 
maintained their significance and strength of effect in the three Northeast multiple 
regression fertility models.  This analysis has shown mixed results regarding the power 
of DTT variables in predicting fertility.  I will move now to a discussion of Models 10, 
11, and 12, all of which examine the TFR in the Southwest, the high fertility region of 
China.   
Models 10-12 
 Models 10-12 (see TABLE 6) correspond to Models 1-3 and Models 7-12, save 
that they are examining fertility in the counties of the Southwest Region, whereas the 
other six models examined fertility in the counties across the nation and in the Northeast 
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Region.  Recall that the mean TFR among the counties of the Southwest is 1.71, the 
highest among the six regions of China.  The Southwest Region contains the provinces 
of Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and the Municipality of Chongqing.  A comparison of per 
capita GDP among these provinces gives one an idea of the economic and 
developmental differences that exist between the Northeast and Southwest Regions. The 
values of average per capita GDP for the three provinces of the Northeast are 9,333, 
5,916, and 7,544 renminbi in Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, respectively.  These 
averages are much higher than those among the four provinces of the Southwest of 
4,684, 4,339, 2,342, and 4,355 renminbi in Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan, 
respectively (CPIRC n.d.).  
Model 10 is equivalent to Models 1 and 7, except that it is estimating the effects 
of the five independent variables on fertility among the 415 counties of the Southwest 
Region.  Three of the variables performed very well in Model 10, while two performed 
very poorly.  At any rate, the model has an extremely high R2 (adjusted) at 0.6361, which 
is significant as F = 145.76 and p = 0.000.  This indicates that the independent variables 
in Model 10 account for almost 64% of the variation in the TFR.   
Percentage urban and percentage one generation were both expected to be 
negatively associated with the TFR, but neither of their coefficients are statistically 
significant in Model 10.  The coefficient of percentage urban maintained statistical 
significance when the regression equation was estimated for the counties of the 
Northeast region; however, in the counties of the Southwest it appears that percentage 
urban has little impact on the TFR.  Perhaps there are an insufficient number of urban 
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residents in the counties of the Southwest for this variable to work properly as a 
predictor.  The coefficient of percentage one generation households is signed in the 
wrong direction and is insignificant in Model 10, just as it was in Model 7.  The 
percentage one generation variable performed well in Models 1-3, across all the counties 
of China, so it is fascinating that it fails as a predictor in both the high and low fertility 
regions.   
 Percentage divorced is negatively related with the TFR in Model 10 and is 
statistically significant at p < 0.005.  As the percentage of the population (15+) that is 
divorced increases, the TFR decreases, holding constant the effects of the other 
independent variables.  This variable was also significant at the same level in Models 1 
and 7. 
 The independent variables anticipated to have a positive association with the 
TFR, percentage minority and percentage female illiterate, show the hypothesized 
effects and are both significant at p < 0.005.  These variables also showed positive 
associations and identical significance levels in Models 1 and 7.  
 The standardized coefficients reveal that percentage female illiterate has the 
strongest influence on fertility among these five variables, b* = 0.437, followed by 
percentage divorced, -0.363, and percentage minority, 0.335. 
 I will now address the results of Model 11, which will be compared with the 
results of Models 2 and 8.  The coefficients in Model 11 indicate that all of the 
independent variables have significant effects on the TFR in the hypothesized direction, 
except for percentage one generation: percentage nonagriculture (-), percentage divorced 
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(-), percentage minority (+), and percentage female illiterate (+).  The R2 (adjusted) is 
0.6432, which indicates that these predictors account for 64% of the variance in the TFR. 
This is very similar to the value of the R2 (adjusted) in Model 10. 
 The standardized coefficients are a helpful source of information when 
comparing the strength of variables in different models.  In Model 11, percentage female 
illiterate has the most powerful influence on the TFR, as b* = 0.391.  It is followed by 
percentage minority, 0.348, percentage divorced, -0.318, and percentage nonagriculture, 
-0.147.  These results are much different from those in Model 2, where percentage 
nonagriculture had the strongest impact among these five variables, trailed by percentage 
female illiterate, percentage one generation, and percentage minority.  Model 8 shows 
the force of these variables in shaping the TFR of the Northeast.  In this model, 
percentage female illiterate and percentage divorce have the greatest effects, followed by 
percentage minority, and percentage nonagriculture.  Percentage one generation is 
insignificant in Model 11 and Model 8 and percentage divorced was insignificant in 
Model 2.  Clearly, these five variables carry distinctive weights and have altered impacts 
when predicting fertility outcomes among the counties of the Southwest Region, the 
Northeast Region, and the entire nation of China.   
I will now discuss Model 12, the last OLS model to be presented in this thesis.  
The variables in Model 12 are identical to those in Models 3 and 9.  To remind the 
reader of the hypothesized relationships regarding the DTT variables, the economic 
development variable in this regression equation is the percentage of the labor force that 
is employed in white collar work, and it is expected to have a negative relationship with 
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the TFR.  That is to say, the higher the percentage of white collar workers, the lower the 
fertility.  The two variables projected to reflect traditional family norms and cultural 
values, the percentage of households that are one generation and the percentage of the 
population (15+) that is divorced, are also both expected to be negatively associated with 
the TFR.  Ethnic distinctions and less restrictive fertility regulations bring about higher 
fertility rates among minority groups; therefore, I anticipate the minority variable to have 
a positive relationship with the TFR.  And finally, demographers have established that 
education has a negative impact on fertility, so I employed female illiteracy as an 
indicator of deficient educational standing.  I hypothesize that percentage female 
illiterate will be positively associated with the TFR.  Namely, I expect that counties with 
a higher percentage of illiterate females will have higher rates of fertility. 
Two variables are unsuccessful in Model 12.  These are percentage white collar 
and percentage one generation.  The coefficient of percentage white collar is signed in 
the right direction, but it is not statistically significant.  The coefficient of percentage one 
generation is signed in the wrong direction and it is also insignificant.  Bear in mind that 
that these are the same two variables that failed in the exact same manner in Model 9, 
the analogous Northeast model.  This means that it makes no difference whether we are 
predicting fertility in the highly developed, low fertility region of the Northeast or the 
rural, underdeveloped, high fertility region of the Southwest.  These two variables do not 
work well in either situation, yet they both show strong effects and significance levels at 
the nationwide level in Model 3.  This is an important finding, though I am uncertain of 
the contributory factors. 
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 The third variable hypothesized to have a negative effect on the TFR is 
percentage divorced.  Its coefficient shows the anticipated effect and is statistically 
significant at p < 0.005.  Percentage divorced was the weakest predictor among the five 
independent variables in all three nationwide fertility models.  Nevertheless, it is one of 
the most powerful predictors in the three Northeast models and three Southwest models.  
Undoubtedly, this was one of the most unexpected discoveries in the entire analysis!   
In Model 12, percentage minority has a positive relationship with fertility as 
expected and its coefficient is significant at p < 0.005.  This signifies that for every one 
unit increase in the percentage of the population that is a member of one of China’s 
minority nationalities, there is a corresponding increase in the TFR, holding the effects 
on the TFR of the other independent variables constant.  This variable also had positive 
and significant associations in Models 3 and 9. 
 Percentage female illiterate has a positive and significant effect on the TFR as 
well at p < 0.005.  The coefficients of percentage female illiterate in Models 3 and 9 
were positive and had the same level of significance as the coefficient in Model 12.  
Thus, in addition to divorce, percentage minority and percentage female illiterate have 
also proven to be solid predictors of fertility among the 415 counties of the Southwest 
Region. 
 In my appraisal of the standardized coefficients, I see that percentage female 
illiterate has the strongest influence over the TFR, b* = 0.439, followed sequentially by 
percentage minority, 0.350, and percentage divorced, -0.344.  Together, the independent 
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variables in Model 12 account for 64% of the variation in the TFR.  The R2 (adjusted) 
statistic is significant as F = 146.58 and p = 0.000. 
 I re-estimated Models 10, 11, and 12 with robust regression and found the robust 
results to be very similar to the OLS results.  Thus, I am confident in my OLS findings.  
Tolerance values on each variable never dropped below 0.30; consequently, I do not 
believe multicollinearity threatened the accuracy of any of these models. 
 While percentage nonagriculture maintained significance, the other two 
economic development variables, percentage urban and percentage white collar, did not 
fare well in predicting fertility among the counties of the Southwest Region.  The other 
variable which proved to be invalid was percentage one generation; the same variable 
which showed insignificance in all three of the Northeast models.   
 As I mentioned earlier, the effects of the economic development and percentage 
one generation variables may have been reduced in magnitude in Models 7-12 because 
of less variation in these variables among the two regional groups of counties.  To check 
out this hypothesis, I compared the coefficient of relative variation (CRV) for the 
requisite variables in the total number of counties and the two regional groups of 
counties.  The CRV is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean.  
Indeed, my prediction that there would be more relative variation in the 2,432 counties 
than in the 216 Northeast counties and 415 Southwest counties proved to be correct.  I 
found that the CRVs among the total group of counties in the variables were as follows: 
percentage nonagriculture, 0.247, percentage urban, 0.362, percentage white collar, 
0.271, and percentage one generation, 0.324. These CRVs are higher than the 
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corresponding CRVs among the Northeast counties of 0.157, 0.273, 0.212, 0.198, and 
among the Southwest counties of 0.229, 0.345, 0.257, and 0.289.  Although several of 
the CRVs were comparable among these three groups, the greater relative variation 
among the variables in the total group of counties undoubtedly contributed to their 
superiority in predicting fertility in Models 1-6. 
 Three variables established themselves as especially robust predictors of fertility 
in the Southwest Region: percentage minority, percentage divorced, and percentage 
female illiterate.  These three variables were also the most resilient variables in the 
fertility analysis of the counties in the Northeast.  The fact that the weakest and strongest 
DTT variables are the same for both the high and low fertility regions is proof that our 
inclinations are not always correct. 
 These OLS results provide somewhat conflicting evidence regarding the 
efficiency of DTT in predicting Chinese fertility.  I will discuss the conclusions and 
implications of the research conducted and reported in this thesis in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The main purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the levels of association between 
social and economic development variables and fertility rates among the counties of 
China in 2000.  This is a noteworthy concern, given the sizeable fluctuations in fertility 
across China today.  Earlier studies have established numerous links between various 
aspects of socioeconomic development and fertility decline in China (Birdsall and 
Jamison 1983; Tien 1984; Poston and Gu 1987; Freedman et al. 1988; Peng 1989; 
Poston and Jia 1990; Poston 2000).  The results of my study are in keeping with these 
previous investigations, lending support to demographic transition theory, which states 
that lowered fertility and lowered mortality arise out of socioeconomic development.  In 
this final chapter, I will summarize my research and findings, acknowledge what I could 
have done differently, and discuss needed future research in this area. 
In order to sustain itself into the future, the People’s Republic of China 
undertook in the 1970s a legendary demographic endeavor in the artificial constraint of 
population growth.  Quite literally, the “later, longer, fewer” policy and the more 
stringent one-child policy were man-made efforts to speed up the demographic transition 
of the country.  Their ultimate goal has been the stabilization and eventual decline of the 
population, via fertility at below-replacement levels for an extended period of time.  This 
strategy has been triumphant in many ways because of the government’s firm control 
over all aspects of Chinese life.    
 98
 
 The “wan (later), xi (longer), shao (fewer)” policy, launched in 1971, insisted 
that couples marry late, extend their birth intervals, and have a small number of children.  
Urban couples were expected to delay marriage until age 25 for women and 28 for men 
and to have no more than two children (Attane 2002).  Rural couples had a little more 
liberty, with marriage age minimums of 23 and 25, and a maximum of three children.  
This campaign was successful in reducing the birthrate from 40.0 per 1,000 in the 1960s 
to 18.3 per 1,000 in 1978 (Tien 1980). 
 In response to the nation’s deteriorating economy, the post-Mao leadership began 
an extensive economic reform effort in 1979 called the “Four Modernizations” (Prybyla 
1990).  One of the most momentous outcomes of this project was the introduction of the 
“household responsibility system,” which transformed communal farming into 
individual family farming (Feder et al. 1992; Prybyla 1990).  Even though land parcels 
are extremely small, supervision is ubiquitous, and governmental contracts are 
obligatory, this new system granted peasants some small degree of autonomy. 
Projections recommended that China restrict its population to 650-700 million by 
the middle of the twenty-first century to be economically and nutritionally stable.  The 
government feared that the nation’s young age cohorts would be an impediment to this 
goal and in January 1979, the government delivered the famous one-child policy 
(Banister 1984; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985).  This policy was intended limit the 
total population to 1.2 billion by the end of the 20th century, so that the forthcoming 
population targets would be met.  
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Four factors were especially important in building civilian conformity to the one-
child policy: (1) the “one child” certificate guaranteeing benefits to couples with one 
child who pledged to have no more, (2) the 1980 marriage law making birth control 
mandatory, (3) the escalating use of abortion and sterilization as fall back measures to 
accomplish the population planning targets, and (4) fines against families having third 
and higher parity births (Cooney and Li 1994; Banister 1987; Tien 1991; Bongaarts and 
Greenhalgh 1985).  The policy seemed very promising to officials, who watched the 
TFR drop from 2.7 in 1981 to 2.1 in 1984 (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988). 
 The one-child policy has been extremely effective in urban areas.  Not only are 
urban residents easier to monitor and control, small families are more conducive to their 
way of life.  Quite the reverse, family planning in rural areas has been a challenge for 
officials, as demonstrated by the lofty percentages of unauthorized rural births.  One 
reason for the struggle has been the “household responsibility system,” which gave rural 
residents new financial independence from higher authorities.  Moreover, by transferring 
responsibility from the commune to the household, the system increased the motivation 
for large families.   
 In an effort to strengthen family planning in rural areas, the State Family 
Planning Commission went through a series of leadership adjustments and developed 
new regulations regarding the one-child policy.  At some points in this process, the 
Commission called for more leniency among the birth planning officials (i.e. cadres), 
while at others, they demanded tighter control.  The result was considerable provincial 
variation in second-child permits, which has in turn contributed to the geographical 
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variation in fertility seen in China today.  According to Census 2000, the TFR ranged 
from a low of 0.67 in Beijing to a high of 2.19 in Guizhou Province. 
 Undoubtedly, China’s family planning policy is largely responsible for the 
nation’s current low fertility level of 1.22, as well as the spatial differences in fertility I 
just mentioned.  Research has shown, however, that other factors have played a part in 
this fertility transition and subsequent variation at the regional, provincial, and county 
levels.  In keeping with the expectations of demographic transition theory (DTT), 
quantitative studies conducted over the last twenty years have linked an assortment of 
socioeconomic factors with China’s fertility decline and nationwide inconsistencies 
(Birdsall and Jamison 1983; Tien 1984; Poston and Gu 1987; Freedman et al. 1988; 
Peng 1989; Poston and Jia 1990; Poston 2000).  My thesis was essentially a continuation 
of this work, using the new demographic data provided by Census 2000.  I tested the 
efficiency of DTT variables in explaining the variation in the TFR among the counties of 
China.  Specifically, I examined the ways in which variables such as ethnicity, 
agricultural detachment, urbanization, economic conditions, cultural norms and gender 
differences were related to Chinese fertility.   
Though similar analyses have been done in the past, my thesis had some 
noteworthy features.  The biggest advantage was that the data came from Census 2000, 
commended for its addition of short-form and long-form questionnaires.  This meant that 
I was able to use predictors seldom used in previous investigations of Chinese fertility.  
These predictors were the percentage (15+) divorced and the percentage of one 
 101
 
generation family households.  Both variables became valuable components in different 
phases of my analysis. 
An additional strength of this thesis is that I had previously performed an 
analysis of the variation in the TFR among the counties of Sichuan Province.  This 
permitted me to identify and solve some methodological problems upfront, acting as a 
catalyst for my thesis.   
According to Census 2000, the mean value of the TFR among the counties of 
China is 1.32 (SD .47), varying from a low of 0.41 in the Xiangyang district of Jiamusi 
city, Heilongjiang, to a high of 5.47 in Baqing County, Tibet.  These wide ranging scores 
yield a range of 5.06, much wider than the range of the TFRs at the provincial level of 
1.52.  The four counties with the highest TFRs are located in the Tibet (Xizang) 
Autonomous Region, a poor, rural region with a large minority composition located in 
northwest China.  The county with the lowest TFR is located in the center of 
Heilongjiang, a well developed province in northeast China.  The sites of these 
outermost values seem suitable given the expectations of demographic transition theory 
(DTT).  Please refer to TABLE 1 for descriptive statistics of the independent variables.  
I will now provide an overview of my statistical analysis and discuss the relevant 
findings. 
In this thesis, I estimated several Ordinary Least Squares regression equations to 
assess the effectiveness of demographic transition theory in predicting Chinese fertility.  
Before the OLS analysis, I employed many diagnostics to ensure statistical accuracy in 
my models.  An evaluation of the distributions of the dependent and independent 
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variables led me to conduct power transformations on all but one of the variables to 
bring in the positive outliers.  Most variables were transformed by the base 10 logarithm.  
I also assessed the zero-order correlations of the independent variables with the TFR and 
with each other (see TABLE 2).  Scatterplots of these bivariate relationships were then 
examined, which provided a visual representation of the positive and negative 
associations among the variables (see FIGURES 1-10).  These initial tests showed some 
collinearity in my independent variables.  Thus I decided to remove percentage 
illiteracy, percentage male illiteracy, and female status from the group of independent 
variables.  This resulted in seven predictors to be used throughout my OLS analysis: (1) 
percentage urban, (2) percentage nonagriculture, (3) percentage white collar, (4) 
percentage one generation, (5) percentage divorced, (6) percentage minority, and (7) 
percentage female illiterate.     
 In consideration of the three highly correlated economic development variables, I 
elected to divide my analysis into three separate OLS models (see TABLE 3).  Models 
1-3 included five independent variables and the TFR.  The four cultural, minority, and 
illiteracy independent variables were exactly the same in all three models; the single 
economic variable was the distinguishing feature.   
Models 1-3 examined the impact of these independent variables on the TFR 
among 2,432 counties across China.  The coefficients of the independent variables in 
Model 1 were all significant and showed the hypothesized effect on the TFR.  With the 
exception of percentage divorced, the coefficients in Model 2 were also significant and 
signed in the expected direction.  And finally, the coefficients in Model 3 revealed that 
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all of the independent variables have significant effects on fertility in the hypothesized 
direction.     
My results from Models 1 and 2 indicate that the classic DTT variables, 
percentage urban and percentage nonagriculture, have the strongest relative effects on 
fertility.  The success of these particular variables champions the notions of demographic 
transition theory.  My findings from Model 3 showed that percentage female illiterate 
has more influence over fertility than the other independent variables, percentage white 
collar, percentage one generation, percentage minority, and percentage divorced.  
Because there are so few white collar workers among the counties of China, this 
economic development variable exerted less comparative influence than those in the first 
two models.    
 The DTT variables that were used in Models 1-3 were identical in Models 4-6, 
the only difference being the addition in Models 4-6 of the region dummies (see TABLE 
4).  DTT performed well even under the regional controls, as the DTT coefficients in 
Models 4-6 were very comparable to those in Models 1-3.  With the exclusion of 
percentage divorced, the coefficients of the DTT variables showed the hypothesized 
effects on the TFR and were statistically significant in all three models.  Additionally, 
the coefficients of the region variables were all positive and significant.  This means that 
even after taking into account the DTT variables in each of the OLS equations, there 
continue to be differences in fertility among the regions.   
In view of these findings, I chose to conduct two region-specific fertility 
analyses, one on the highest fertility region of China and one on the lowest (see 
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TABLES 5-6).  This was intended to test the predictive power of the DTT variables in 
two divergent settings, each being composed of a rather homogeneous group of low (or 
high) fertility counties.  The impact of the DTT variables on fertility changed drastically 
under these restricted conditions.  Models 7-12 are analogous to the basic three models 
seen in TABLES 1-3.   
TABLES 5-6 display the results regarding the fertility analyses of the Northeast 
Region and Southwest Region.  I will begin with the two predictors which floundered in 
Models 7-12.  The coefficient of percentage one generation households shows neither 
the hypothesized relationship nor a statistically significant effect on the TFR in any of 
the six models.  This variable had a significant negative effect on fertility in all three 
nationwide models, but when operating on fertility only in the counties within each of 
these regions, its effect is reversed and becomes insignificant.   
Percentage white collar was included in Models 9 and 12, and although it has the 
expected negative relationship with the TFR, its coefficient is insignificant in both 
models.  When this variable was included in Model 3, it had one of the strongest relative 
effects among the five predictors.  I speculate that this variable may have succeeded in 
the nationwide analysis simply because of its association with urbanization and 
economic progress.  In the nationwide analysis, there was sufficient developmental 
variation among the 2,432 counties for this variable to perform well in the OLS 
regression equation.  Variation was smaller among the 415 counties in the 
underdeveloped Southwest and also amid the 216 counties in the developed Northeast.  
The predictive capabilities of percentage white collar were thus effectively removed.   
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 The coefficients of percentage nonagriculture, percentage minority, percentage 
divorced, and percentage female illiterate show the hypothesized effects and are 
statistically significant in Models 7-9.  The coefficient of percentage urban is 
insignificant in Model 10 of the Southwest Region, but shows a negative and significant 
effect on fertility in Model 7 of the Northeast Region.  Percentage divorced has the 
largest relative impact on fertility in the developed Northeast in two out of the three 
models.  This is a fascinating turn of events given that the variable was the weakest 
predictor in all three nationwide models.  In all three of the Southwest models, it is 
percentage female illiterate that has the largest relative effect on fertility.  Moreover, 
each of these variables, percentage divorced and percentage female illiterate, perform 
exceptionally well in every one of the high and low fertility models.  Percentage 
minority should also be mentioned for maintaining significance and strength of effect in 
all six region-specific models.    
 Even though the effects of the DTT predictors changed somewhat from the 
nationwide to the region-specific fertility analyses, overall I think they performed quite 
nicely.  The OLS results from the twelve different models convey that demographic 
transition theory is applicable for predicting and understanding fertility among the 
counties of China.  Irrespective of the nation’s extensive family planning policy, it is 
beyond doubt that other factors contribute to the inconsistent fertility rates across the 
country.   
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Looking back, there are faults in my analysis which I will now take the time to 
discuss.  I will also offer suggestions for how these issues could have been more 
effectively managed.   
My analysis could have been greatly enhanced had it been possible to include a 
measurement of per capita income.  Previous Chinese fertility studies have benefited 
from the use of such indicators, since they provide a more truthful account of economic 
status.  The three economic development variables I used, percentage urban, percentage 
nonagriculture, and percentage white collar, are related to economic standing, but an 
indicator of tangible economic standing would have been better.  Census 2000 does not 
contain such information, so I am restricted in this way by the data. 
The analysis also would have benefited from the incorporation of a few family 
planning variables, given that the family planning program has such a huge effect on 
fertility in China, apart from and in conjunction with socioeconomic factors.  For 
example, an independent variable pertaining to family planning costs might have been 
particularly useful, since wealthier jurisdictions often have the upper hand when it comes 
to birth restriction.  Their clinics are better outfitted, but more importantly they are able 
to offer greater financial incentives to couples accepting the one-child certificate.  
Moreover, it would have been fascinating to bring in a measurement of abortion 
frequency, since abortions are routinely used to accomplish the birth planning targets.  
Census 2000 supplies no information regarding family planning activities; so again, I am 
constrained in this respect. 
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Another variable that should have been included in this analysis is the infant 
mortality rate (IMR), which has been found to have a large impact on fertility in China.  
A major postulate of demographic transition theory (DTT) is that fertility decline 
follows infant mortality decline.  I thus consider it to be a necessary component in any 
study which attempts to evaluate the relevancy of DTT in projecting fertility outcomes.  
Census 2000 does not provide mortality rates for each age group; however, I could have 
resorted to another measure capturing the survival rate of children.  The census has data 
on “children ever born, per woman 15-50” and also on “the average number of children 
survived until the date of the census.”  While the measure would not have been a 
satisfactory substitute for the IMR, it is likely the closest approximation afforded by the 
data source, and it should have been employed.  Future analysis would do well to use 
such a proxy. 
The one problematic variable in this analysis was the female status variable, 
which is a ratio of percentage female illiterate to percentage male illiterate.  A value 
greater than 1.0 on this variable signified more female illiteracy, while a value less than 
1.0 signified more male illiteracy.  Educational inequality encourages social inequality, 
which demographers have linked to higher levels of fertility.  Therefore, I hypothesized 
that this variable would be positively associated with Chinese fertility.  Both its 
correlation with the TFR and its effect on the TFR were negative, which contradicted my 
expectations and the claims of DTT.  Obviously, the female status variable failed to test 
the gender bias-fertility association in this county-level analysis of China.  Perhaps I 
should have resorted to a different type of measurement in my attempts to quantify 
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sexual inequality.  The census provides data on educational attainment for both men and 
women, with categories ranging from “never been to school” to “graduate school.”  I 
could have created an ordinal variable consisting of the eight categories of educational 
attainment provided by the census, from 1 = lowest, to 8 = highest.  I have reservations 
about such a variable; however, since it is debatable as to whether or not the educational 
categories are evenly spaced.  For instance, it is questionable whether a transition from 
high school to technical school is equivalent to a transition from college to graduate 
school.  Data are also available on “the average years of education” for men and women.  
So another alternative would have been to develop a female status variable from the ratio 
of these two averages.  One more option would have been to create a series of education 
dummy variables. 
A further criticism that could be put forth about my analysis is the absence of 
indexes, which may have helped with variable augmentation and improvement.  For 
example, in this thesis I estimated the effects of percentage of the population in 
nonagriculture, percentage of the population urban, and percentage of the labor force in 
white collar jobs in separate OLS models because of the high degree of collinearity that 
exists among them.  Instead, it may have been better to combine them into a single 
index.  Uniting them in this way would bypass collinearity issues and allow for an 
estimate of their simultaneous effect on fertility.   
In the years to come, I hope to extend my research on Chinese fertility by 
utilizing more involved statistical strategies.  In the present analysis, I predicted the 
average fertility behavior of women in counties with the contextual characteristics of the 
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counties.  This is a common tactic and it has proven to be a reasonably successful one.  
There are many people who strongly favor this macro-approach to the study of fertility.  
This group contends that it is the larger environment that shapes fertility decisions.  In 
other words, it is the contextual characteristics of the community in which a person lives 
that ultimately determine the number of children ever born to him/her.  For this reason, 
they believe it makes more sense to measure the fertility outcomes of the aggregate, 
rather than those of the individual.  The variables used in my thesis, such as percentage 
urban and percentage nonagriculture, are good examples of these macro-level predictors.  
In his article, entitled “Where Do Babies Come From?” Norman B. Ryder expressed this 
macro position regarding fertility research (1980: 197): “Fertility is a collective property 
of a system, to be explained in relation to other collective properties of the same system.  
Far from being an expedient in lieu of individual-level analysis, a macro orientation is 
theoretically appropriate” (1980: 197).  
At the same time, others argue that since fertility decisions are made at the 
individual-level, they should be measured and predicted at the individual-level, as 
opposed to the aggregate-level.  In other words, it is individuals that generate the fertility 
levels of the populace, rather than the other way around.  Therefore, in an attempt to 
understand that which influences fertility, one should look to the individual for answers.  
A person’s educational attainment, ethnic affiliation, and occupational status are 
examples of predictors that may be used in this type of micro-level study.  
Each perspective is valid and worthy of pause.  Rather than disregarding either 
line of reasoning altogether, there is an approach that satisfies both factions of logic—
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the multilevel analysis.  In a multilevel analysis, there are independent variables at more 
than one level predicting the outcomes of the dependent variable.  This allows the model 
to take into account both the individual-level (i.e. micro) characteristics as well as the 
aggregate-level (i.e. macro) characteristics in producing estimates.   
In future research, I aspire to use multilevel modeling in my dissertation on 
Chinese fertility, as it will impart a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics 
involved in fertility decisions and outcomes.  The 1% Sample of the 2000 Census of 
China will soon be released, which provides descriptive data on a sample of women 
from all the counties in China.  Micro-level variables that may be used regarding the 
individual woman are age, agricultural affiliation (yes/no), level of education, and 
whether she is a member of the Han majority nationality (yes/no).  Macro-level variables 
that may be used regarding the county context include the percentage of persons 
employed in non-agricultural jobs, the proportion of persons in each county working in 
white collar jobs, and the percentage of persons (15+) illiterate.  The outcome variable 
will likely be a dummy variable indicating whether the woman had a birth during the 18 
months preceding the date of the census of November 1, 2000, 1=Yes, 0=No.  I believe 
my fertility research will benefit from this more progressive statistical strategy, and in 
turn, I will have more to contribute to the field. 
 Demographers have expended a great deal of time and energy in explaining that 
which they once thought was virtually impossible, the manifestation of below-
replacement fertility and its rapid movement through societies across the world.  But 
today, there is an epidemic of even greater demographic concern that leaves our 
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economies and social well-being in the balance.  This is the spread of lowest-low 
fertility, or TFR levels of 1.3 or less.  Fourteen countries in Southern, Central, and 
Eastern Europe arrived at this lowest-low fertility level in the 1990s, the initial qualifiers 
being Spain and Italy (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002).  As Kohler et al. (2002: 642) 
explain, “If the TFR declines further and persists at a level of 1.0, the annual rate of 
decline in the stable population rises to 2.4 percent and the halving times of population 
size and birth cohorts are merely 29 years.” 
 While these European countries have TFRs of 1.3, most African countries today 
boast TFRs of 6.0.  The demographic research regarding these high fertility societies is 
limited because most sub-Saharan African countries did not perform an exhaustive 
census until around 1960.  Data are still very restricted in comparison to other countries 
around the world, but there have been many improvements over the last three decades.  
Purportedly, all African countries have TFRs above 4.0, and only a handful have TFRs 
below 6.0 (Foote et al. 1993).  
There is an incredible paradox in the world’s fertility.  If we are to ever gain a 
true understanding this most complicated demographic phenomenon, it will be by way of 
cross-country comparisons.  China is fascinating in that within itself it exhibits high 
fertility levels resembling those of sub-Saharan Africa, as well as lowest-low fertility 
levels resembling those of Europe.  Perhaps some of the same socioeconomic and 
cultural factors inspiring these divergent rates of fertility are shared among China, 
Africa, and Europe.  It is imperative that demographers address this question in the years 
to come and I hope to be involved in the challenge.   
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
TABLE 1  Descriptive Statistics for Fertility Rates and Social, Economic, and Cultural Variables: 
2,870 Counties of China, 2000 
    Standard 
Variable  Mean deviation Minimum value  Maximum value 
Total fertility rate  1.32 0.47  0.41   5.47 
      Xiangyang District of  Baqing County (Tibet) 
      Jiamusi City (Heilongjiang)      
  
% Population  27.84 25.25  2.07   98.91 
Nonagriculture Jiangda County (Tibet) Tiedong District of Anshan City  
    (Liaoning) 
 
% Population  28.66 20.96  0.56   100.00 
Urban      Linxia County (Gansu) 3 Districts of Bengbu City (Annui)   
         Meijiang District of Meizhou City  
        (Guangdong)  
 
% Labor Force  8.59 6.49  1.37   38.62 
White Collar     Dongxiangzu Zizhi  Xiangyang District of Jiamusi City 
      County (Gansu)  (Heilongjiang) 
 
% Population (15+)  1.09 0.79  0.16   8.23 
Divorced      Hongsibao District of  Leiwuqi County (Tibet) 
      Wuzhong City (Ningxia) 
 
% Households  20.93 7.05  3.75   58.87 
One Generation     Dongxiangzu Zizhi  Baoan District of Shenzhen City 
      County (Gansu)  (Guangdong) 
 
% Population  16.14 28.97  0.00   99.78 
Minority      Qingjian, Zizhou, Lin  Angren County (Tibet) 
      and Shilou Counties of (Shanxi) 
 
% Population (15+)  11.49 11.19  0.55   86.22 
Illiterate      Beiliu City (Guangxi)  Baqing County (Tibet) 
 
% Male Population  6.76 8.55  0.24   78.16 
(15+) Illiterate     Beiliu City (Guangxi)  Baqing County (Tibet) 
 
% Female Population  16.47 14.27  0.89   94.33 
(15+) Illiterate     Beiliu City (Guangxi)  Baqing County (Tibet) 
 
Female Status  3.16 1.41  0.94   16.49 
      Kangbao County (Hebei) Pingyuan County (Guangdong) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SOURCE: 2000 Population Census of China (State Council and State Statistical Bureau 2002) 
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TABLE 2  Zero-order Correlations of Dependent and Independent Variables: 2,432 
Counties and County Equivalents of China, 2000 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
   (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)      (7)      (8)      (9)      (10)      (11) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) log10 Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR)   __  
 
(2) log10 % Population 
Non-agriculture   -0.568      __ 
 
(3) sqrt % Population   
Urban          -0.560    0.845    __                
 
(4) log10 % Labor Force   
White Collar  -0.455    0.838    0.754    __   
 
(5) % Households 
One Generation  -0.422    0.464    0.538    0.449    __      
 
(6) log10 % Population  
(15+) Divorced    -0.087    0.328    0.228    0.363    0.178    __ 
 
(7) log10 % Population 
Minority    0.232    0.035   -0.028    0.056   -0.102    0.440    __     
 
(8) log10 % Population         
(15+) Illiterate   0.439   -0.428   -0.386   -0.298   -0.179    0.113    0.298    __   
 
(9) log10 % Male    
Population (15+) Illiterate  0.394   -0.406   -0.399   -0.261   -0.190    0.206    0.314    0.941    __     
      
(10) log10 % Female  
Population (15+) Illiterate   0.441   -0.412   -0.361   -0.300   -0.167    0.069    0.284    0.987    0.878    __  
 
(11) log10 Female Status                 -0.115    0.184    0.249     0.064    0.127   -0.313   -0.197  -0.375   -0.665   -0.228    __ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SOURCE: 2000 Population Census of China (State Council and State Statistical Bureau 2002) 
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TABLE 3 Multiple Regression Coefficients for the TFR on DTT Independent 
Variables: 2,432 Counties and County Equivalents of China, 2000 
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Sqrt % Population Urban -0.060*** 
 
(-0.371) 
 
 
 
Log10 % Population Nonagriculture 
 
 -0.175*** 
 
(-0.405) 
 
 
Log10 % Labor Force White Collar 
  
 -0.158*** 
 
(-0.259) 
 
% Households One Generation  -0.007*** 
 
(-0.154) 
 
 -0.008*** 
 
(-0.181) 
 -0.011*** 
 
(-0.236) 
Log10 % Population (15+) Divorced  -0.035*** 
 
(-0.065) 
 
 -0.008 
 
 (0.015) 
 -0.023* 
 
(-0.042) 
Log10  % Population Minority    0.020***
 
  (0.167) 
 
  0.021*** 
 
 (0.179) 
   0.019*** 
 
  (0.161) 
Log10  % Female Population (15+) Illiterate    0.120***
 
  (0.238) 
 
  0.098*** 
 
 (0.194) 
   0.141*** 
 
  (0.281) 
Constant    0.382   0.651 
    
   0.380 
R-squared (adjusted)    0.421   0.434 
    
   0.381 
 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.005 
 
SOURCE: 2000 Population Census of China (State Council and State Statistical Bureau 2002) 
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TABLE 4 Multiple Regression Coefficients for the TFR on DTT Independent 
Variables and Region: 2,432 Counties and County Equivalents of China, 2000 
 
Independent Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Sqrt % Population Urban  -0.051*** 
(-0.315)  
 
Log10 % Population Nonagriculture   -0.139*** (-0.322) 
 
Log10 % Labor Force White Collar    -0.123*** (-0.201) 
% Households One Generation  -0.008*** 
(-0.183) 
 -0.010*** 
(-0.209) 
 -0.011*** 
(-0.248) 
Log10 % Population (15+) Divorced    0.005 
  (0.009) 
   0.018 
  (0.033) 
   0.007 
  (0.013) 
Log10  % Population Minority    0.020*** 
  (0.168) 
   0.020*** 
  (0.171) 
   0.020*** 
  (0.169) 
Log10  % Female Population (15+) Illiterate    0.086*** 
  (0.172) 
   0.076*** 
  (0.152) 
   0.103*** 
  (0.206) 
North    0.244***
  (0.299) 
   0.223*** 
  (0.273) 
   0.295***  
  (0.361) 
East    0.242***
  (0.342) 
   0.207*** 
  (0.292) 
   0.255*** 
  (0.359) 
Central & South    0.282***
  (0.396) 
   0.253*** 
  (0.355) 
   0.293*** 
  (0.412) 
Southwest    0.352***
  (0.451) 
   0.323*** 
  (0.415) 
   0.367*** 
  (0.470) 
Northwest    0.214***
  (0.262) 
   0.194*** 
  (0.238) 
   0.260*** 
   0.319 
Constant    0.215    0.420 
    
   0.168 
R-squared (adjusted)    0.495    0.494 
    
   0.461 
 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.005 
 
SOURCE: 2000 Population Census of China (State Council and State Statistical Bureau 2002) 
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TABLE 5 Multiple Regression Coefficients for the TFR on DTT Independent 
Variables: 216 Counties and County Equivalents of Northeast China, 2000 
 
Independent Variables Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Sqrt % Population Urban  -0.024* 
 
(-0.226) 
 
 
 
Log10 % Population Nonagriculture 
 
 -0.081** 
 
(-0.242) 
 
 
Log10 % Labor Force White Collar 
  
 -0.044 
 
(-0.106) 
 
% Households One Generation   0.004 
 
 (0.094) 
 
   0.003 
 
  (0.074) 
   0.002 
 
  (0.054) 
Log10 % Population (15+) Divorced  -0.165*** 
 
(-0.370) 
 
  -0.147*** 
 
 (-0.330) 
  -0.198*** 
 
 (-0.445) 
Log10  % Population Minority    0.047***
 
  (0.264) 
 
   0.044*** 
 
  (0.251) 
    0.050*** 
 
   (0.282) 
Log10  % Female Population (15+) Illiterate    0.190***
 
  (0.317) 
 
   0.198*** 
 
  (0.330) 
   0.202*** 
 
  (0.337) 
Constant   -0.458   -0.324 
    
  -0.503 
R-squared (adjusted)    0.449    0.450 
    
    0.437 
 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.005 
 
SOURCE: 2000 Population Census of China (State Council and State Statistical Bureau 2002) 
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TABLE 6 Multiple Regression Coefficients for the TFR on DTT Independent 
Variables: 415 Counties and County Equivalents of Southwest China, 2000 
 
Independent Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
Sqrt % Population Urban  -0.006 
 
(-0.029) 
 
 
 
Log10 % Population Nonagriculture 
 
 -0.083*** 
 
(-0.147) 
 
 
Log10 % Labor Force White Collar 
  
 -0.052 
 
(-0.063) 
 
% Households One Generation   0.001 
 
 (0.019) 
 
   0.004 
 
  (0.067) 
   0.002 
 
  (0.035) 
Log10 % Population (15+) Divorced  -0.262*** 
 
(-0.363) 
 
  -0.230*** 
  
 (-0.319) 
  -0.248*** 
 
 (-0.344) 
Log10  % Population Minority    0.041*** 
 
  (0.335) 
 
   0.043*** 
 
  (0.348) 
    0.043*** 
 
   (0.350) 
Log10  % Female Population (15+) Illiterate    0.245*** 
 
  (0.437) 
 
   0.219*** 
 
  (0.391) 
    0.247*** 
 
   (0.439) 
Constant   -0.343  -0.142 
    
   -0.317 
R-squared (adjusted)    0.636    0.643 
    
    0.637 
 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.005 
 
SOURCE: 2000 Population Census of China (State Council and State Statistical Bureau 2002) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURES 
 
FIGURES 1-10 Scatterplots of TFR and Independent Variables: 2,432 Counties and 
County Equivalents of China, 2000 
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FIGURE 1: TFR & Percentage Population Nonagriculture (r = -0.568) 
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FIGURE 2: TFR & Percentage Population Urban (r = -0.560) 
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FIGURE 3: TFR & Percentage Labor Force White Collar (r = -0.455) 
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FIGURE 4: TFR & Percentage Households One Generation (r = -0.422) 
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FIGURE 5: TFR & Percentage Population (15+) Divorced (r = -0.087) 
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FIGURE 6: TFR & Percentage Population Minority (r = 0.232) 
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FIGURE 7: TFR & Percentage Population (15+) Illiterate (r = 0.439) 
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FIGURE 8: TFR & Percentage Male Population (15+) Illiterate (r = 0.394) 
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FIGURE 9: TFR & Percentage Female Population (15+)  Illiterate (r = 0.441) 
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FIGURE 10: TFR and Female Status (r = -0.115) 
 
SOURCE: 2000 Population Census of China (State Council and State Statistical Bureau 2002) 
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